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This is an analysis of the countries of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay which argues that public 
support for democracy and the rule of law in these countries is impacted by the institutional 
reform processes which are mediated by the social cleavages within these states. The paper 
begins with a qualitative overview of each country’s experiences before, during, and after 
military dictatorship. The overview assesses the degree to which each country underwent 
successful institutional reform at the time of transition to democracy, and how institutional 
reform impacts public perceptions. Also built within the qualitative overview are the historical 
experiences which ultimately divide these societies into clusters which voice support for various 
initiatives based upon their socioeconomic and class identities. Institutional reform and these 
cleavages, crafted by the historical experience, thus act in conjunction with one another to impact 
public perceptions. Subsequent sections take a closer look at the public opinion data to conduct 
cross-national and within-region analyses. The paper concludes with what lessons can be learned 








CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Following periods of military rule and state terrorism (Argentina: 1974-1984, Chile: 
1973-1990, and Uruguay: 1973-1985), Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay transitioned to democracy. 
During the transitional phase, and indeed well after it, the state is tasked with the question of 
how to apportion justice for crimes against humanity. Naturally, perpetrator and victim have 
competing interests in how the past is framed, blame is assessed, and justice is served. 
The purpose of this study is to determine how the style of institutional reform chosen by 
each country now impacts contemporary public support for democracy and the rule of law. I 
argue that key parts of institutional reform can shape public attitudes, but also that the impact of 
institutional reform is mediated by each country’s shared historical memory and practices. As 
such, I argue that the relationship between institutional reform and the amnesty vs. accountability 
balance and contemporary public support for democracy and the rule of law is not direct. 
Socioeconomic and generational divides make it so that certain segments of the population 
respond differently to the style of institutional reform pursued. Therefore, factions also differ in 
contemporary public support for democracy and the rule of law. These divides serve to illustrate 
that there is no uniform way in which institutional reform has been processed. Thus, while 
certain approaches may lead a majority of the population to draw a certain conclusion that 
impacts their views in the present, it is not the case that certain institutional reforms will signal a 
uniform consensus regarding whether a decision strengthens or hinders public support for 
democracy and institutions. The reality is opposing socioeconomic classes and generations 
usually desire different ends. And whether the government is pursuing policy that they believe is 
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aimed at reaching those ends can impact support of their government and sometimes in turn 
democracy at large.   
One component of institutional reform that is particularly impactful is whether members 
of complicit institutions under dictatorship are predominantly given amnesty or prosecuted. 
Another is whether these institutions are given a great deal of discretion post-transition or are 
more closely monitored. Relatedly, whether these institutions have been able to overcome 
tarnished legacies of yesteryear and gain the public trust in the present is an additional key driver 
of contemporary public attitudes. These are all developments that begin at the time of 
institutional reform and impact the current public support for democracy and the rule of law—
building upon the shared historical foundation provided by the experience of military 
dictatorship. 
Observers often compare Argentina and Chile’s approaches to transitional justice, 
describing Argentina’s as a kind of retributive justice, while Chileans opted instead for 
restorative justice: the former punitive and passionate, the latter reconciliatory and forgiving 
(Robben 2010). Uruguay, alternatively, is known for largely ignoring the transitional justice 
question altogether. For some time, scholars have sought to understand why these Southern Cone 
nations have gone down divergent paths, and the power of the military post-transition, public 
opinion, and the relationship between the executive and the judiciary have all been considered in 
attempts to provide holistic explanations for why each nation chose its respective path. 
I argue herein that one type of institutional reform will not unilaterally lead to an 
outcome, as the socioeconomic and demographic composition of a country can mediate the 
relationship between institutional reform and public support for democracy and the rule of law. 
Drawing from the premise that shared historical memory of past military dictatorship impacts 
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public attitudes, a reasonable assumption is that citizens who lived under military dictatorship 
will harbor different attitudes than citizens only living under democracy. Southern Cone citizens 
with experience under dictatorship could be more supportive of democracy, for instance, since 
they know what the alternative can be. Alternatively, they could feel as though democracy grants 
citizens and elites too much discretion, perchance increasing the likelihood of crime and 
corruption, and they harbor nostalgia for the perceived stability and order of dictatorship. My 
analysis tests out these competing hypotheses. 
Socioeconomic status, too, could be a key predictor in whether citizens prefer democratic 
or authoritarian measures. The wealthy are considered to be the economic beneficiaries of 
Pinochet’s Chile and Argentina’s juntas, and in Uruguay, economic collapse cut the military’s 
reign short, but they did try to appeal to the wealthy while in power, targeting leftwing activists. 
Does this create a contemporary situation whereby the wealthy are nostalgic for the neoliberal 
policies of yesteryear? Or are the wealthy now good democrats, in part because the neoliberal 
consensus is rarely challenged nowadays by popular movements from the left? The wealthy, 
then, have no reason to fear democracy from an economic standpoint. Is it the case then that the 
Southern Cone follows other Latin American trends that show the poor are the staunchest 
proponents of authoritarian measures, particularly harsher approaches to crime, as they deem 
their greatest threat to be their fellow working poor, perhaps of an alternative racial complexion? 
In this regard, class solidarity before and during dictatorship is no longer as palpable amongst the 
poor, and it becomes the poor, like the wealthy of the past, who perceive it to be in their best 
interest to support authoritarian measures. In the context of Chile, then, an authoritarian enclave 
of around one-third of the population could still persist, even if it does not consist of the same 
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third, from a socioeconomic standpoint, that Pinochet’s did. These competing theories, too, are 
put to the test.    
 The three cases illustrate very different patterns of reform. In Uruguay, institutional 
reform was sought largely independent of any great efforts to prosecute. Resultantly, while 
contemporary democratic measures hold quite strong, there are practices under the dictatorship 
that continue to persist in the present that disproportionately negatively impact the Uruguayan 
poor. Given Uruguay’s history in which the industrial elite have aligned with the national 
security apparatus and mixed messaging from political elites who constitute the poor’s elected 
officials, absolute reform is stymied by the fact that majority sectors lack incentives to fully 
complete the project.  
Chile’s democratic reforms can be predominantly characterized as a success, for this 
analysis makes it clear that a healthy majority of Chileans, based on several public opinion polls, 
never abandoned a democratic predisposition in the first place. Furthermore, Chileans, across all 
demographics, increasingly render a negative assessment of military government and the 1973 
coup, and nowadays Chileans with the greatest wealth are the strongest proponents of 
democracy—a phenomenon that was not the case in the build-up to military dictatorship. What 
has held constant in Chile since the 1970s is that assessment of the economy has proven to be the 
most important concern when choosing to support or oppose the government, well outpacing 
human rights concerns. This held true under Pinochet as well as today, and so the ultimate test 
for Chile will likely be how its wealthy react to the next severe economic downturn.  
Finally, in Argentina, there is significant distrust in both the police and military—
certainly not ideal for a healthy democracy. With regard to the military, this is in part due to the 
humiliation of the military during transition, a humiliation that has been criticized for placing too 
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much blame on the military at the expense of other complicit agents. A silver lining is that trust 
in military is on the rise and as of 2012 north of 50%, a positive trend that serves as a testament 
to the military’s efforts to refrain from influencing political outcomes. Trust in the police, 
however, lags behind the military’s, and this is in part due to increases in crime following 
transition and in part due to failed attempts at police reform. Disappearance and torture continue 
and, perhaps most troubling, police have transitioned to targeting the poor so as to win the 
approval of the middle class—and the media helps to frame the narrative of a criminal poor that 
must be aggressively policed. 
Analyses confined to Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay are a rarity, and Uruguay in 
particular is often overlooked in examinations of Latin American justice reform and democratic 
transition. To my knowledge, a direct comparison of these cases and their contemporary 
democratic framework has not been conducted. Insofar as a keen understanding of these cases is 
pivotal in determining whether their efforts at institutional reform have yielded healthy 
democracies, what this study can also do is pinpoint areas in which these states can improve their 
institutions in order to ensure democratic continuity. For sometimes democratic transition is 
perceived as a static event that occurred in the past as opposed to something that is constantly 
evolving. As such, even if it is conceded that mistakes occurred at the time of initial transition, 
this does not mean that there are no ways to rectify past missteps in the present. Since this study 
maintains its gaze on past influential events—ranging from labor struggles to coups to 
constitutional reforms—while also dissecting contemporary survey data and events on the 




For much of what initially draws oneself to Latin America is the splendor of revolution, 
the rise of the underdog who sees that a better world is possible—or at least that the struggle on 
the path to a better world is a worthy pursuit. Of course, the fate of the revolutionary often reads 
as a Shakespearean tragedy. Allende whets the palate of those seeking a revolutionary tale, and 
the story is worth revisiting to determine what can be learned from it. However, sometimes Latin 
America is confined to its past revolutions, and, in a sense, the present is neglected because it 
lacks the luster of the past. These cases at hand are of interest because they are the byproduct of 
the fireworks of yesteryear; the revolutionary impulse of idealists does not die when a state 
transitions to democracy, and it is alive and well all the more so when reform is perceived to be 
inadequate. 
In recent years in Uruguay, student protests have erupted—demanding increased funding 
for education.
1
 A key reason as to why the military dictatorship imploded in Uruguay was 
because it cut social spending and did not appreciate the welfare state legacy of Uruguay; to this 
day, we can plainly see the importance this tradition holds in Uruguay, and that students will 
even protest left-wing governments that make cuts to education.  
Chilean students, similarly, have protested court decisions to allow universities to be for-
profit, as well as the use of police violence upon peaceful protestors. These protests demonstrate 
the younger generation’s divergence from older Chileans: since higher education was free until 
Pinochet “paved the way for the emergence of private universities with no constraints on tuition 
fees” in 1981, younger Chileans know that historically the Chilean state was able to provide free 







education, and furthermore they may well associate for-profit universities with dictatorship.
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Unlike older Chileans who either attended for-profit universities or who are less likely to take to 
the streets due to fear of repercussions instilled by the Pinochet dictatorship, younger Chileans 
are using their understanding of history to demand better educational opportunities and do not 
bring with them the same trauma that holds back their older counterparts. That police brutality is 
also a topic of protest is important; while police have a relatively high degree of trust in Chile, 
engaging in brutality runs the risk of lessening trust and, as a result, weakening democracy.  
Anti-austerity protests as well as protests against the freeing of heinous human rights 
abusers have occurred in Argentina during the Macri presidency. Such protests serve as evidence 
that the grassroots in Argentina has been frustrated by Macri’s economic policies, which are 
perceived to be hurting the poor, and his approach to human rights, which activists argue “fits a 
pattern of his administration’s tamping down efforts to seek justice for the atrocities carried out 
during the dictatorship”. In the words of Nora Cortinas, a leader of the Mothers of the Plaza de 
Mayo, “We stood up to a dictatorship and are still fighting — why would we stop now?”3 
Cortinas’ sentiment is emblematic of a sentiment that can be applied across the three 
cases: the fight continues. Advocates of social progress are still necessary to ensure the 
government represents the interests of its people. The battle may no longer be to restore 
democracy, or the levels of abject poverty that inspired an Allende may no longer be as high as 
they once were, but there are still conditions that are unsatisfactory, and, in a positive sense, 
many are conditions that can be improved. Justice reform is at the heart of the social reform 
agenda. The public needs to be able to trust its justice institutions: its courts, police, and military 






 See https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/world/americas/argentina-mauricio-macri-luis-muia.html. 
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in order for there to be a rule of law. Political elites and members of these institutions have 
agency in increasing the public trust, in large part by applying the same standard to everyone and 
refraining from engaging in corruption and human rights abuses. Reformists will continue to 
apply pressure on powerful actors, and citizens, in turn, should report attitudes that are reflective 
of the quality of democracy on offer. This study and these cases matter because they provide 
insight into what is working and what needs fixing. 
These cases are fascinating ones for analysis, as Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay have each 
implemented institutional reform in their transitions to democracy. Furthermore, each country 
has provided amnesty to some perpetrators of state violence and prosecuted others. The balance 
that each country has struck differs due to the aforementioned variables at play. 
I examine how these institutional changes may shape public support for democracy and 
the rule of law, which I measure by the public’s trust in democracy and its institutions. The 
Argentine, Chilean, and Uruguayan states all uphold the core criterion of democracies, although 
justice reform is still an Achilles heel. Because institutional reform impacts public belief in a 
state’s democratic commitment, questions including whether Argentines, Chileans, and 
Uruguayans would justify a military coup or the degree to which they trust their police and 
military will be analyzed. The dispositions that each state’s public harbors ultimately serve as the 
measurements for public support for democracy and the rule of law.           
 In Chapter 1, I have provided a definition of the purpose of this study, its intellectual 
contribution, and a brief introduction to the cases and the variables that are prevalent throughout 
subsequent discussion. Henceforth, Chapter 2 will expand upon the methodology used in this 
project including how exactly I measure key variables of interest: institutional reform, quality of 
democracy, and the rule of law. Chapter 3 will then provide the qualitative overview of the 
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institutional process in each case, as well as highlight the high degree of interrelation between 
key institutions such as the executive, courts, and military. Chapter 4 will consist of an 
evaluation of public support for democracy and the rule of law, relying upon survey data. 
Chapter 5 will then involve a discussion of the socioeconomic and generational divides that serve 
to intervene between institutional reform and contemporary trust in democracy and its 
institutions. Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion of what the findings mean to the relationship 























CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
 
 I will analyze institutional reform, the independent variable, qualitatively. For each case, 
I provide a brief historical overview of the period of military rule, followed by a discussion of 
the conditions of each state at the time of transition. How much power did the executive, 
judiciary, and military respectively yield during transition? What were the desires of these bodies 
of government and, if these desires clashed, which bodies were able to use the mechanisms of the 
state to get their way? What role did public opinion play in the state’s approach to transitional 
justice? In order to paint a holistic picture regarding who or what determined the path of 
institutional reform pursued, these are the questions that need be answered, and a qualitative 
assessment of these cases is the best way to reach necessary answers to these questions.  
 In order to measure public support for democracy and the rule of law, the dependent 
variable, survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) will be utilized. 
Citizens in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay are all asked questions pertaining to support for a 
military coup, executive unilateralism, trust in police, military, fair elections, democracy, human 
rights protections, torture, and approaches to crime prevention. These questions, directly or 
indirectly, gauge public commitment to democratic principles. Altogether, the data from LAPOP 
provides a wealth of information regarding how the citizens of the Southern Cone view the 
quality of their democracies, and allows for me to confidently assess public support for 
democracy and the rule of law in these countries from the vantage point of the people whose 
mandate ensures democratic continuity.  
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 The 2012 LAPOP survey contains questions that help operationalize different dimensions 
of support for, or opposition to, democracy. In accord, I have selected 15 questions that measure 
public support for democracy and the rule of law, and provide each question with an 
accompanying conceptual definition. Further, I divide the 15 questions into 4 categories 
separated thematically: I. Support for Authoritarian Measures, II. Trust in Institutions Involved 
in Authoritarian Rule, III. Quality of Democratic Government, and IV. Abuse of Power / 
Authoritarian Measures. 
For Category I, support for a coup d’état and support for executive unilateralism are 
examined. To be certain, if a high percentage of a populous is either supportive of a coup or 
strongman rule, this is a sign that a democracy is at risk of reversal. One can further deduce that 
high support of a coup endorses giving high discretion to the military to act in its preferred 
manner, which opens the door for human rights abuses. Executive unilateralism, equally, risks 
shutting out other branches of government, and grants a great deal of discretion to the president 
to do as they see fit independent of dictates of the constitution. Overall, high levels of support for 
either of these principles are troubling signs for democracy and the rule of law.    
Support for Democracy 
Measures of the Dependent Variables 
Table I: Support for Authoritarian Measures 
Conceptual definition Survey question Measurement Percentage stating yes 
Support for a Coup 
d’état 
Some people say that 
under some 
circumstances it 
would be justified for 
the military of this 
country to take power 
by a coup d’état 
(military coup). In 
your opinion would a 
Index of support for a 
coup d’état: ranges 
from 0 (no) to 100 
(yes) whereby 100 
indicates high support 












military coup be 




When there is high 
unemployment; 
When there is a lot of 
crime; 
























Support for Executive 
Unilateralism 
Do you believe that 
when the country is 
facing very difficult 
times it is justifiable 
for the president of 
the country to close 
the 
Congress/Parliament 





dichotomously as yes 
and no. 
Index of support for 
executive 
unilateralism: ranges 
from 0 to 100 
whereby 100 indicates 










Category II includes trust in police, police integrity, trust in the military, and military 
respect for human rights—all variables that gauge public trust and support of institutions that are 
most closely associated with authoritarian rule. If trust in these institutions is low, this does not 
bode well for democracy: either the public still associates these institutions with authoritarian 
rule, or, they no longer associate them with authoritarian rule but instead distrust them on the 
basis of their current practices. Malone highlights this pivotal process by which citizens learn to 
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trust institutions previously associated with dictatorship: “Rather than dismiss state actors like 
the courts, who served to legitimize state repression and corruption under authoritarian rule, 
citizens need to turn to justice institutions to redress problems and grievances” (Malone 2012: 
14). Her focus in this passage is justice institutions, but the same premises very much hold for 
security institutions as well. Citizens either learn to trust these institutions, trust earned by an 
impartial enforcement of the rule of law, or they do not—either because these institutions do not 
reform and apply the same standard to everyone or the public is unwilling to believe that they are 
doing so. Ultimately, without trust, “it is unlikely that they [these institutions] will be 
transformed into pillars of the rule of law” (Malone 2012: 16). 
 Trust in police and military and military respect for human rights were originally coded 
on a 1-7 scale, in which the lowest number corresponds with the lowest degree of trust. These 
responses were then recoded so that a response of 1 represents a score of 100 and a response of 7 
represents a score of 0. The purpose here was to comprise graphs in which the higher score 
corresponds with a higher level of authoritarian disposition. Police integrity was originally coded 
on a 1-3 scale in which “Police protect people from crime” was coded as 1, “Police are involved 
in crime” was coded as 2, and “Neither, or both” was coded as 3. These responses were recoded 
so that a response of 1 represents a score of 0, a response of 2 represents a score of 100, and a 
response of 3 represents a score of 50. Altogether, this process allowed for me to put all survey 
responses on the same 0-100 metric. 
Table II: Trust in Institutions Involved in Authoritarian Rule 
Conceptual definition Survey question Measurement Scores (0-100 scale) 
Trust in Police To what extent do you 
trust the National 
Police? 
 
Responses were on a 
The original 7-point 
scale was transformed 
into a 0-100 scale in 
which 100 denotes 








1-7 scale. distrust) in the police. 
 
Trust the police = 0 
Distrust the police = 
100 
1.84 
Police Integrity Some people say that 
the police in this 
community (town, 
village) protect people 
from criminals, while 
others say that the 
police are involved in 
the criminal activity. 
What do you think? 
 
Police protect people 
from crime; 
Police are involved in 
crime 
The original 3-point 
scale was transformed 
into a 0-100 scale in 
which 100 denotes 
high belief the police 
are involved in 
criminal activity. 
 
Police protect people 
from crime = 0 
Police are involved in 







Trust in the Military To what extent do you 
trust the Armed 
Forces? 
 
Responses were on a 
1-7 scale. 
The original 7-point 
scale was transformed 
into a 0-100 scale in 
which 100 denotes 








Military Respect for 
Human Rights 
To what extent do you 
believe that the 




Responses were on a 
1-7 scale. 
The original 7-point 
scale was transformed 
into a 0-100 scale in 
which 100 denotes 










Category III assesses public trust in the electoral process and the government’s respect 
for human rights. Naturally, trust in free and fair elections is vital for a democracy; if this trust 
erodes, the door is opened for suitors who use the electoral lack of legitimacy to stake their claim 
to rule on the basis that the electoral process is illegitimate anyways. The question regarding 
human rights is actually quite curious as there is the option to express a belief in too much 
respect for human rights. Seemingly, such a respondent believes that some human rights ought to 
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be rescinded from other individuals or minority groups, and political leaders have been known to 
fan the flames of support for harsher anti-criminal policies to gain electoral support. Dammert 
discusses this very phenomenon: 
Now there is not a dichotomy between prevention and control. Now the antinomy in 
populist discourse is this: I am with the victims and you are with the criminals. There is 
no more debate between those supporting prevention and those advocating control. Now 
the political fight is to see who can succeed in claiming to champion the rights of victims, 
and who can cast their political opponents as friends of delinquents. Garantismo 
(protection of civil liberties) has become a plague in Latin America, without ever 
becoming a reality first (Appialoza and Dammert 2011). 
 One can readily see why branding a political opponent as pro-delinquent, anti-victim 
could be both politically advantageous and drive up support for more punitive measures, 
independent of their actual effectiveness in reducing crime. According to this perspective, laws 
protecting the human rights of criminals is decreasing public safety and impeding punishment for 
offenses; the remedy is to roll back protections for criminals, and grant public officials ample 
discretion. If a high percentage of the population does believe that respect for human rights is too 
prevalent, this is threatening to democracy: the door is opened for strongmen offering the 
promise of a rescinding of human rights granted to minority groups, political opponents, etc. 
Once again, original responses were on a 1-7 scale, in which the lowest number 
corresponds with the lowest degree of trust. These responses were then recoded so that a 
response of 1 represents a score of 100 and a response of 7 represents a score of 0. The purpose 
here was to comprise graphs in which the higher score corresponds with a higher level of 
authoritarian disposition. 
Table III: Quality of Democratic Government 
Conceptual definition Survey question Measurement Scores (0-100 scale) 
Free and Fair 
Elections 
To what extent do you 
trust elections in this 
The original 7-point 







Responses were on a 
1-7 scale. 
into a 0-100 scale in 
which 100 denotes 





Respect for Human 
Rights 
 
To what extent do you 
believe that the basic 
rights of the citizen 
are well protected? 
 
Responses were on a 
1-7 scale. 
The original 7-point 
scale was transformed 
into a 0-100 scale in 
which 100 denotes the 
belief that basic rights 








Category IV gauges support for torture, iron fist crime prevention, non-elected leaders, 
and alternatives to democracy. Approval of any of these approaches signals trouble for 
democracy: there are no shortage of strongmen willing to offer these prescriptions to a public 
should the possibility open to subvert democracy. Support for practices such as torture or an iron 
fist approach to crime may additionally reveal that a state has yet to overcome its authoritarian 
legacy. In Uruguay, for instance, torture still persists, apparently, because no elites have 
prioritized eradicating it (Skaar 2015: 84-85). Police are able to, at times, adopt an iron fist 
approach to crime prevention in Argentina partly due to elite backing, but also likely because 
they have shifted their target from the middle class to the poor. Resentful “New Poor” residing in 
the middle class are appreciative of the fact that the police are targeting the undeserving poor and 
not themselves, and the wealthy are always susceptible to supporting punitive approaches to 
crime that does not affect their livelihoods. The media in Argentina also depicts the poor as 
criminals with great regularity, driving up support for punitive approaches from the middle and 





Table IV: Abuse of Power / Authoritarian Measures 
Conceptual definition Survey question Measurement Scores (0-100 scale) 
Support for Torture If the police torture a 
criminal to get 
information about a 
very dangerous 
organized crime 
group, would you 
approve of the police 
torturing the criminal, 
or would you not 
approve but 
understand, or would 
you neither approve 
nor understand? 
The original 3-point 
scale was transformed 
into a 0-100 scale in 
which 100 denotes 
approval of torture. 
 
Would not approve or 
understand = 0 
Would not approve, 
but would understand 
= 50 







Support for Iron Fist 
Crime Prevention 
Do you think that our 
country needs a 
government with an 
iron fist, or do you 
think that problems 













Support for a Non-
elected Leader 
There are people who 
say that we need a 
strong leader who 
does not have to be 
elected by the vote of 
the people. Others say 
that although things 
may not work, 
electoral democracy, 
or the popular vote, is 
always best. What do 
you think? 
 
(1) We need a strong 
leader who does not 
have to be elected  
(2) Electoral 
democracy is the best 
Percentages listed for 
the percentage of 
respondents who 
expressed support for 
(1) We need a strong 
leader who does not 
have to be elected. 
 
Strong leader 
unelected = 100 
 
Electoral democracy 







Democracy as Best 
Form of Government 
Democracy may have 
problems, but it is 
better than any other 
form of government. 
To what extent do you 
The original 7-point 
scale was transformed 
into a 0-100 scale in 
which 100 denotes 








agree or disagree with 
this statement? 
democracy as best 





Which of the 
following statements 
do you agree with the 
most: (1) For people 
like me it doesn’t 
matter whether a 
government is 
democratic or 
nondemocratic, or (2) 
Democracy is 
preferable to any 
other form of 




government may be 
preferable to a 
democratic one. 
Percentages listed for 
the percentage of 
respondents who 
expressed support for 
(1), (2), and (3) 
respectively. 
 
Doesn’t matter = 100 
 
Democracy preferable 
to any other form = 0 
 
Authoritarian 
government may be 
preferable under some 

























CHAPTER 3: QUALITATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE INSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 
 
Uruguay 
 Uruguay experienced predominantly uninterrupted democratic rule up until the 1960s 
but, like many other countries in the region, US-inspired anti-communism compelled Uruguay to 
enter into an “authoritarian interlude” (Skaar 2015: 68). Uruguay was a participant in Operation 
Condor, sharing intelligence with other participating nations and engaging in the “killing of real 
or imagined opponents of the regime” (Skaar 2015: 68). Uruguay’s dictatorship (1973-1985) is 
noteworthy for having the largest number of political prisoners per capita in the world. This 
statistic earned Uruguay an infamous nickname: “the torture chamber of Latin America” (Lessa 
2015: 2).  
 The dictatorship’s primary target were the Tupamaros, a left-wing urban guerilla group 
based in the Uruguayan capital of Montevideo, whose mission was societal revolution via the 
practice of robbing the rich and giving to the poor. Holmes (2006) deems the two primary causes 
for Uruguay’s eventual slide towards authoritarianism to be the threat of the Tupamaros guerilla 
movement along with the failure of Uruguay’s economy. As such, a closer examination of the 
Tupamaros is necessary in order to understand the Uruguayan landscape pre-dictatorship as well 
as during the dictatorship.  
 The Tupamaros was founded by socialist lawyer Raul Sendic and, although later 
renowned for its mobilization in Montevideo, began in the north of Uruguay as a movement 
aiming to improve the legal rights and social conditions of sugar workers. Initially committed to 
using nonviolent tactics, their protests centered around addressing poor labor and housing 
conditions, but their actions were generally in vain. Indeed, the lack of success in the countryside 
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prompted Sendic to reconsider his tactics, and the two changes he made were to use a clandestine 
guerilla model and move the base of operations to Montevideo (Milligan 2012: 5). 
 Following the move to the city, “the Tupamaros achieved the first stages of their strategy 
without terrorism,” redistributing wealth and garnering public support in the process because of 
the very fact that it was using nonviolent methods and shrewdly exposing corruption in clever 
ways. It can additionally be surmised that the Tupamaros’ earlier commitment to nonviolence 
when they were merely a rural workers’ movement further lent them credibility; in the eyes of 
the public, their motives were pure. However, a steadfast commitment to nonviolence would not 
last, and Milligan points to the election of Colorado candidate Juan Maria Bordaberry in 1972 as 
the moment in which the Tupamaros’ “campaign of violence relaunched with a renewed vigour,” 
sparking an increase in violence and threat to both the state and the civilian population (Milligan 
2012: 6).  
In turn, the public began to rapidly withdraw support for the now perceived-to-be 
dangerous Tupamaros, and this provided the state with the opportunity to suspend civil liberties 
with the rationale being that guerilla violence had created a national emergency (Holmes 2006: 
147, Weinstein 1988: 39). Milligan considers this suspension of civil liberties to be a pivotal 
moment in the evolution of the dictatorship, as the dictatorship would later continue to suspend 
civil liberties even when the Tupamaros were no longer a threat to societal peace (Milligan 2012: 
6). In other words, once the state was able to set the precedent of suspending civil liberties, it 
was able to continue to do so even in the absence of the justification, the Tupamaros threat, for 
the inaugural suspension. 
1972 was additionally such a turning point because the Tupamaros now faced “an 
increasingly well-equipped and adequately prepared military that had finally been given a 
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blankcheck to get rid of the problem [the Tupamaros]” (Weinstein 1988: 41). Holmes 
corroborates Weinstein’s claim as military spending under the Bordaberry regime approximately 
doubled from 13.9% to 26.2% of total government outlay, and education spending was the 
resultant casualty as spending was reduced from 24% to 16% of the national budget (Holmes 
2006: 91). In this regard, a once proud cornerstone of the Uruguayan welfare state, education, at 
least temporarily, was undermined in favor of a budget allocation that was atypical by 
Uruguayan standards. 
Weinstein’s account of the Uruguayan slide towards authoritarianism is measured: the 
Tupamaros does share responsibility for escalating violence that increased the political influence 
of the armed forces in Uruguay, but what they cannot be blamed for are the practices employed 
by Uruguay’s rulers from 1973-1984 (Weinstein 1988: 40). For while one could concede to the 
armed forces that the Tupamaros threat in 1972 required an aggressive military presence, these 
same conditions were not present from 1973-1984 and yet the armed forces continued to rule in 
the same manner as they did when the threat was at its peak. Handelman argues that the armed 
forces were enabled by a largely supportive industrial elite who sought and successfully forged 
bonds with the military, very much a familiar tale in the greater context of military dictatorships 
in Latin America (Handelman 1981: 379).  
Handelman’s study on Uruguay is particularly fascinating as he compiled strike data in 
the decade preceding the military regime, during a time of economic crisis most assuredly, but he 
argues that the data serves as a “symptom of the wider polarization of Uruguayan society at the 
time” (Milligan 2012: 11). This assessment runs counter to the typical account of Uruguay as a 
state with minimal socioeconomic divide and class conflict. Such conventional wisdom may 
indeed still hold post-dictatorship, but, according to Handelman, in the pre-dictatorship 1960s 
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“class conflict had a great effect on the attitudes of the industrial elite, to the extent that the 
sector came to condone repressive measures in controlling the country’s labour force” 
(Handelman 1981: 376). At the very least, any pretense that the military was acting unilaterally 
while a uniform Uruguayan population looked on passively can be dismissed: the industrial elite 
aligned with the military. Handelman’s 1976 survey adds credence to this conclusion: nearly half 
of all industrialists saw the strike actions and guerilla movement as part of a single coordinated 
campaign by the political left (Handelman 1981: 378).  
According to Holmes, the Tupamaros threat had essentially been eradicated by 1973, and 
yet the government was still using the Tupamaros threat as a means to crackdown upon striking 
workers. And the industrial elite consciously aligned with the government and its repressive 
tactics. Milligan contends that Uruguay experienced what Nun coined as a “middle class military 
coup” and Handelman called Uruguay’s case “a coup partially instituted in response to the needs 
of the nation’s industrial elite” (Nun 1967, Handelman 1981: 379). Either way, an influential 
elite, altogether separate from the Uruguayan populous at large, paved the way for the military to 
serve their interests even when the terrorist threat was long gone. And even if we are to grant that 
Uruguay has less socioeconomic division than the vast majority of Latin America, and certainly 
more so than Argentina, this relative class homogeneity does not preclude an industrial elite from 
existing nor from using their influence to manipulate the levers of power within society. 
While the industrial elite seized the opportunity to forge a close bond with the military, 
for they realized they had a stake in military rule’s continuity, it is pivotal to note that the 
Uruguayan population at large had a low degree of faith in the state as it was functioning under 
democracy. Milligan argues that in the wider population the overriding perception was that “the 
orthodox democratic government…was now guilty of a failure to cope with the economic slide 
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of the 1950s and 1960s” (Milligan 2012: 12). Such a point serves to illustrate that it was not as if 
the military was taking democracy away from a public that was very much committed to 
maintaining it; while the population may not have considered democracy to be the reason as to 
why the state could not counteract the economic slide, they bluntly lacked incentives to prioritize 
maintaining a democratic system that struggled to deliver economic results. Moreover, 
authoritarian measures did quell labour conflicts and the Tupamaros so, insofar as one desired 
relative stability in the economic and national security realms, military rule might well be 
amenable, and thwarting the Tupamaros threat lent the regime credibility to apolitical and 
conservative sectors of the population. As faith in democratic institutions diminished, confidence 
in the armed forces grew.  
Appealing to the apolitical was a conscious strategy of Uruguayan military rule. In 
refraining from politicizing social life under the dictatorship, a sort of ‘antipolitics’ prevails and 
“reduces the levels of popular political participation” (Sondrol 1992: 192). In this respect, the 
Uruguayan military’s approach of ‘depoliticization’ is very much in the mould of Pinochet’s 
Chile or present-day Argentina under Mauricio Macri: the public is asked to, by and large, 
disengage from politics and allow for the technocrats and hegemonic forces to steer the political 
ship.  
The military regime found allies in civil society as well. The Catholic Church, pivotal to 
the support network of the Argentine junta as well, found common ground with the military on 
“preaching a return to traditional values of duty, order and nationalism,” creating both a 
conservative coalition but equally importantly “diverting citizens’ attention from politics to other 
realms,” such as family and sport (Sondrol 1992: 195). Thus, the Uruguayan dictatorship’s 
decision to refrain from engaging in all aspects of societal life, and instead align with forces that 
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are natural allies and allow for them to aid in diverting citizens away from politics showcased 
that, according to Sondrol, “the military saw its project, in fact, as defensive; saving traditional 
society from subversive Marxism’s revolutionary ideology, which was seen as attacking the 
spiritual assets of the nation, with a view to imposing a new order of values” (Sondrol 1992: 
195). The framing here is in lockstep with Pinochet’s Chile, but the Uruguayan dictatorship 
deviates from Chile in its lack of ambition. While the Pinochet regime immediately consolidated 
its power and refused to recognize any limitations, the Uruguayan dictatorship recognized 
limitations such as its “singular lack of expertise in the fields of economics and foreign policy,” 
which forced them to accept a civilian role in the executive, or the democratic legacy in Uruguay 
(Handelman 1981: 3). Democracy was of course steeped in Chilean history too, and Pinochet did 
not boast economic expertise and instead outsourced this endeavor to the Chicago Boys, so 
hypothetically, Pinochet, too, could have acknowledged limitations that would have restricted 
consolidating his mandate. Pinochet did not do this, and this divergence in approaches could well 
help explain the divergence in outcomes. 
So Uruguay’s military regime did not have the same transformative ambitions as a 
Pinochet’s Chile, but they were still able to largely present themselves as innocuous to political 
neutrals by allowing them to remain tied to their institutions of choice. In turn, the public 
allowed the military to rule, and the military left alone anyone who was not stridently left-wing. 
“Unlike authoritarian Argentina or Chile,” contends Sondrol, “Uruguay was less a tyranny of 
horror and death than one of stringency and insipidness” (Sondrol 1992: 198). Indeed, the junta 
claimed to be building a new Uruguay, but their actions mostly reinforced the status quo. They 
did not attempt to abolish Uruguay’s major political parties, and politicos that were cultivated by 
the military regime emerged post-transition firmly committed to democracy and civilian rule. It 
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begs the question that, if the military did not overplay its hand and eventually transition to 
engage in mass arrests, would the Uruguayan populous have allowed them to rule longer than 
they were ultimately able? 
For what remains curious about the Uruguayan case is that the public did not aggressively 
lobby for prosecution of Uruguay’s military officials. Yes, Uruguay has less social division than 
other cases, but Handelman’s findings suggest social division still existed to the extent that one 
would expect classes who were victimized by the regime to mobilize around accountability. 
Perhaps what could be a useful explainer for this phenomenon is the regime’s deliberate strategy 
of refraining from entirely uprooting the democratic framework; in essence, even though the 
military did eventually proceed to engage in arrests and mass detention, it was still confined to 
the political left, and they either coddled or left alone powerful institutions like the Church and 
political parties across the Uruguayan political spectrum. Thus, insofar as citizens take political 
cues from party elites, Frente Amplio elites were not terribly mistreated by the military regime 
and therefore did not seek vengeance upon the military once democracy was restored. Its base, 
too then, may have adopted a similar perspective: yes, military rule was a momentary lapse in 
reason, but they did not destroy our democratic framework, and further yet they showed restraint 
on this count—they never attempted to abolish Uruguay’s democratic impulse when they very 
well could have tried.  
Despite exhibiting some degree of restraint and a willingness to align with sympathetic 
sectors of society and leaving be neutral sectors, Uruguay’s military regime proceeded to 
squander the legitimacy the public bestowed upon it, in large part due to its great reductions in 
social spending. The military regime proved no better at handling the economy than the previous 
civilian government, and therefore the public was no longer able to associate solely democracy 
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with poor economic performance. Now losing legitimacy, and actually now on the receiving end 
of vocal opposition in the 1970s, the military government doubled down on its initial approach 
by continuing to increase military spending and granting more discretion to law enforcement to 
treat the population forcefully (Milligan 2012: 16). Torture, interrogation, and disappearances 
became the norm. 
The military would have preferred lower-middle and working class elements of society to 
remain disengaged from politics, but when these elements proved stubborn, the military opted 
for a repressive approach that would “terrorise citizens into avoiding politics, by banning 
elections, exiling politicos and torturing activists” (Sondrol 1992: 194). Sondrol writes that “the 
diffusiveness, excessive breadth and unpredictability of this criterion [used to repress a large 
faction of society] induced a pervasive and arbitrary witch hunt against a wide swath of 
relatively compliant Uruguayan society” (Sondrol 1992: 196). The Tupamaros were eradicated, 
and yet by mid-1976 the regime had jailed 6000 political prisoners, amounting to 1 in every 500 
Uruguayans. Inevitably, such an iron-fist approach lacking any semblance of nuance loses in the 
court of public opinion.  
The sequence of events suggests that internal opposition to the military regime filled the 
void left by the Tupamaros. The problem for the military was that internal opposition was not 
violent in the way that the Tupamaros movement eventually became; in essence, the military 
proceeded to disproportionately crackdown against an opposition that did not possess the same 
capacity as the Tupamaros, and such tactics only further eroded public support for military rule. 
The military desperately wanted its opposition to behave in the same manner as the Tupamaros, 
as that would garner public sympathy for aggressive retaliation, but, in superimposing the same 
model it used against the Tupamaros upon a far less militant opposition, it alienated the 
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population. Drawing from Handelman, “since the military has justified its political intervention 
and accompanying political repression in terms of the alleged threat of ‘internal subversion,’ it 
must accept the principle that its rule is finite” (Handelman 1981: 3).  
Like most bodies that come to power, the military was not willing to accept that, 
according to the terms of the original mandate, its rule would end when the threat of ‘internal 
subversion’ did, and in accord they tried to create an artificial ‘internal subversion’ to justify its 
rule. They were unsuccessful in this regard, and in fairness to them it is hard to envision a way in 
which they could have been successful: the dynamics had changed, and Handelman further notes 
that “even the armed forces found it difficult to blatantly reject the principle [of democracy]” 
which had been a cornerstone of the Uruguayan state throughout the 20
th
 century (Handelman 
1981).  In this sense, military rule was always likely to be temporary, its legitimacy lasting as 
long as a threat that permitted the suspension of civil liberties was existent.   
Jose Mujica, president of Uruguay from 2010-2015, was infamously imprisoned by the 
dictatorship for 13 years for his association with the Tupamaros. Following the same script as 
other military dictatorships in the region, communists, anarchists, and other left-affiliated groups 
were targeted by the regime as well, via means of disappearance, detention, exile, and torture. 
Scholars estimate that 2% of Uruguay’s population, at the time 3 million, were detained and 
tortured at some point, while other scholars find the number to be closer to 200,000 Uruguayans 
illegally detained, imprisoned, or tortured (Lessa and Fried 2011). Skaar uses findings that put 
the percentage of the Uruguayan population thrown into prison at 10% (SERPAJ 1989).  
 Uruguay’s transition was pacted, and similar to the Chilean case the power of the military 
remained intact. Argentina bucks the trend of initially seeking amnesty for perpetrators of state 
crimes, but Uruguay falls firmly in line with other Latin American transitions and expectations at 
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large. The newly-elected rightwing government of the Colorado Party, with Julio Maria 
Sanguinetti (1985-1990, 1995-2000) at the helm, had no intention of challenging military power. 
The close association between the Colorado Party and the Uruguayan military is well-
documented, and both Sanguinetti and the military operated under the consensus they would 
protect each other during the period of transition.    
 Borrowing from the “two demons” theory most closely associated with Francisco Franco 
and the Spanish amnesty of 1977, Sanguinetti called “for the establishment of a “symmetry of 
guilt” between Tupamaros and the military,” with the clear intention of assigning equal blame to 
the Tupamaros and the dictatorship” (Schallenmueller 2014: 12). Although the first referenda on 
the amnesty law held in 1989 largely split along partisan lines, the fact that the immunity for the 
military won 56.7% of the vote is suggestive that Sanguinetti was at least partially successful in 
purporting his narrative. The referenda emboldened his policies of refusing demands for truth 
and “rejecting requests to order judicial inquiry on the whereabouts of missing persons” 
(Schallenmueller 2014: 13).  
 Uruguay is also notorious for the degree to which it did not prosecute officials guilty of 
crimes during dictatorship. In 1986, the Uruguayan Parliament enacted an amnesty law, the Ley 
de Caducidad, and for 25 years this law prevented any investigation into the crimes of the 
dictatorship.  The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), in particular, has been critical of 
Uruguay’s “silence” which creates, in their estimation, “a legacy of impunity”. Skaar notes that 
“pressure for transitional justice was largely absent in the 1980s and early 1990s,” so with 
minimal grassroots pressure the state was able to continue its policy of impunity with very little 
pushback (Skaar 2015: 70). Uruguayan lower courts initially proved themselves to be willing to 
hear cases brought to them by individuals and NGOs, but provisions in the amnesty laws ensured 
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“that as a long as the president opposed judicial action against the military, no punitive action 
would take place,” and this “effectively curbed judicial independence” (Skaar 2015: 72). Judges 
were virtually sidelined from the Uruguayan human rights question for the ensuing two decades. 
 Uruguay’s failures in the area of judicial reform are worthy of further examination. The 
two Sanguinetti governments in Uruguay stand out as being particularly hostile to demands for 
truth and justice because, in addition to crafting amnesty laws in collaboration with the military, 
the executive has the power to decide whether each case should be investigated. Naturally, if an 
executive wants no cases to be investigated, then that is how it shall be. Skaar finds that in 
Uruguay, of the first four administrations following transition who all opposed trials and 
handcuffed the judiciary (Sanguinetti I, Lacalle, Sanguinetti II, and Batlle), only under Batlle’s 
administration did any trials occur—and even in this case their purpose was only for truth-
finding and not prosecution (Skaar 2010: 15). It is not until Vasquez’s administration in 2005 
that trials in earnest could begin, a testament to the fact that he favored trials and therefore could 
allow them even though the judiciary was still non-independent due to the restrictions of the Ley 
de Caducidad. Vasquez holds the distinction of being the only president across Argentina, Chile, 
and Uruguay to hold successful trials even when the judiciary was still non-independent. While 
independent judiciaries were able to overcome executives unfavorable to trials in Argentina and 
Chile, this did not occur in Uruguay. Regarding Vazquez, Skaar writes, “executive endorsement 
provided space for judicial action and some liberal/activist judges made use of it, no longer 
fearing sanctions” (Skaar 2010: 17).      
Uruguay does rank first in the world in terms of its number of truth-seeking projects, but 
Skaar does find that “the practice of torture was left largely unaddressed by all four truth-seeking 
attempts” (Skaar 2015: 69). Two parliamentary commissions were established right after the 
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transition, but their mandate was restricted to investigating disappearances, thus precluding 
illegal detention, imprisonment, and torture. They also lacked official recognition from the 
Sanguinetti government, and therefore were never afforded the opportunity to link institutions 
under the military dictatorship with the crimes being investigated. Subsequent commissions 
“promised to pay reparations to families of victims who died in detention under military rule, as 
well as to the victims of guerilla violence” (Skaar 2015: 76). Reparations are oft criticized as a 
means of “paying off” victims at the expense of justice, this is certainly a prevalent topic of 
contention in the Argentine case, but nevertheless this has been the preferred means of apology 
chosen by the Uruguayan government. 
Skaar raises the point that Uruguay has chosen to refrain from pursuing a “systematic 
documentation of the most widespread violation: torture” (Skaar 2015: 76). Uruguay has been 
widely criticized for its continued practice of torture in the present, and it is entirely plausible 
that there is a link between its unwillingness to bring instances of torture under the military 
dictatorship to the forefront and the prevalence of torture today.  
 Since the fall of dictatorship, Uruguay held two referenda on the amnesty law: the public 
just happened to vote to keep the law on both occasions, in 1989 and 2009 respectively (Skaar 
2015: 67). In this regard, Uruguay tackled the amnesty question with an approach becoming of a 
democracy, even if the results were not those desired by the human rights community, nor 
necessarily the expectations in a society as progressive as Uruguay’s. 
 President Tabare Vazquez (2005-2010, 2015-present) of the left-wing Frente Amplio 
coalition is credited with making the most progress on dictatorship accountability during his first 
term as president. His presidential mandate rendered led to eventual verdicts against former 
dictators Juan Maria Bordaberry (1972-1976) and Gregorio Alvarez (1981-1985). Accountability 
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slowed down under Vazquez’s predecessor Jose Mujica (2010-2015), somewhat surprising given 
his progressive reputation and domestic agenda.   
 Under Mujica, the Movement of Popular Participation (MPP), refused to annul the Ley de 
Caducidad, in effect punting on the issue when stating “I already said that it was not my 
problem…the government will maintain the same profile as before of keeping out of the 
discussion” (Fernandez 2011: 1). Furthermore, Mujica felt that it was “the political force that had 
to take charge of that problem [because] the government…considered it a very difficult issue” 
(Fernandez 2011: 1). Taking Mujica’s comments at face-value, one ascertains that he did not feel 
as though the government had the political leverage to overturn the law, regardless of his 
personal feelings on the matter. His 2011 stance is consistent with his sentiments in 2010 that 
Frente Amplio legislators should resolve the issue “if they can…[but] I already have too many 
problems in government and if the political force does not have the votes, it does not have the 
votes: that simple” (Fernandez 2011: 1). Quite clearly, Mujica considered annulling the law to be 
politically impracticable, and as a result the eventual annulment was not executive-driven. 
 Mujica’s position, however, did draw ire from fellow party elites such as senator 
Constanza Moreira who said, “these are historical moments in which a leftist force assumes its 
historical commitment or abandons it, decides whether it is left-wing or not” (Fernandez 2011: 
1). Intraparty dissent such as Moreira’s undermines the idea that party elites were wholly unified 
behind Mujica’s passivity, and further challenges the conception that party elites are uniformly 
unresponsive to the human rights question. And contrary to the perception that Uruguay lacks a 
grassroots base on the human rights question, Fernandez argues, “the anger and the indignation 
grow from below” on a range of issues from human rights to the privatization of the railway to 
lands increasingly going into the hands of large landowners and multinationals (Fernandez 2011: 
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1). While difficult to quantify just how many Uruguayans on the left for which Fernandez was 
speaking in 2011, there was dissatisfaction with the Mujica-led Frente Amplio’s policies that 
they perceived as a turn to the right. 
 The Ley de Caducidad was overturned by the Uruguayan parliament in October 2011, 
which signaled to many the possibility that Uruguay was ready to commit to thorough 
investigations of crimes committed by the dictatorship. However, the data reveals that such 
expectations have not come to fruition. As of 2015, only 6 out of 256 criminal cases have been 
completed with a final sentence from the Supreme Court, amounting to 2% of the total cases. 164 
cases, or 63%, are in the pre-indictment stage. By contrast, during the same period of 2011-2015, 
Argentina completed 58 trials—resulting in a discrepancy of approximately 10: 1 (Lessa 2015: 
2). While it is the case that Argentina has been prosecuting dictatorship officials for longer and 
with more vigor, such a lopsided discrepancy brings into question Uruguayan claims that the 
country is truly committed to prosecution following the overturn of the Ley de Caducidad.    
 Skaar’s findings regarding court cases are more optimistic than Lessa’s. She finds that 
“conviction rates relative to the number of cases presented in court are much higher [for 
Uruguay] than for Argentina” (Skaar 2010: 2).  
 A common perspective is that amnesty laws achieve the goals of peace and stability, what 
Skaar classifies as a “negative peace, meaning the absence of armed violence” (Skaar 2015: 83). 
Uruguay has not experienced a democratic reversal since its pacted transition and initiation of 
amnesty laws, so perhaps it is the case that justice is the price to pay in order to ensure 
democratic stability. The counterfactual cannot be played out in Uruguay, of course, though 
Argentina provides us with the most diametrically opposed approach to Uruguay in this study. 
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 The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset corroborates the idea that 
Uruguay is a solidly democratic nation. Uruguay has received the highest score of 2 (on a 0-2 
scale) in three of four indicators since its transition in 1985, the only exception being torture 
(Skaar 2015: 84-85). Torture has received a score of 0 in 2 of the last 5 years Uruguay has been 
scored (1995 and 2005), and torture has never received a score of above a 1. Trailblazer 
Uruguayan prosecutor Mirtha Guianze notes that “human rights violations are taking place 
everywhere” and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) found in a 2013 
report that, “in spite of having very low crime rates, [Uruguay] has one of the highest rates of 
inmates in preventive (pretrial) detention in all of Latin America: 180 per 100,000 inhabitants” 
(IACHR 2013: 30). This “existence of a deep-rooted culture among justice operators favoring the 
use of pretrial detention as a precautionary measure” is clearly embedded in society, and 
although Uruguayans are no longer targeted for their political views it remains the case that 
suspected criminals are excessively detained and at great risk of exposure to indecent treatment 
(IACHR 2013: 21). 
 Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment, Manfred Nowak, stated after visiting Uruguay in 2009, “I did receive numerous 
credible allegations of force in prisons, police stations and juvenile detention centres,” adding 
that at a particular penitentiary he saw both convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees held 
together “like animals in metal boxes” for almost 24 hours a day, often drinking from toilets. 
Nowak also reported that detainees were cutting themselves in order to receive medical care 
from doctors that they would otherwise be denied.
4
 The Pan American Health Organization’s 
2015 poll on prisoner health conditions found that “medical treatment was inadequate,” “slightly 
                                                 
4
 See https://news.un.org/en/story/2009/03/295332-un-rights-expert-urges-uruguay-end-appalling-prison-conditions. 
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more than 8% [of inmates] attempted suicide,” “and 18% alleged suffering mistreatment”.5 A 
similar report from the government’s National Mechanism for the prevention of Torture 
“reported as major problems the lack of sufficiently trained staff, poor building conditions that 
resulted in overcrowding and violence, and insufficient social and educational activities”.6    
 Prison Insider has highlighted Uruguay’s highly punitive penal policy as well: the rate of 
297 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants in 2016 ranked Uruguay 2
nd
 in the region, and they too 
point to “excessive use of pretrial detention,” accounting for 65% of Uruguay’s total incarcerated 
population, as one of the primary causes for this high rate.
7
 They further note that the 
incarcerated population is “primarily composed of young people, poor…and living in 
neighbourhoods that lack the resources to reverse the processes of economic and social 
imbalance”.8 With respect to the question of why the Uruguayan public has tolerated both 
minimal prosecutions of military officials and increasing incarceration rates in a state that at 
face-value should not yield a high prison rate, the answer could then lie in the fact that both 
populations (human rights advocates and prisoners) are more prone to coming from poor 
backgrounds. Wielding hardly any political influence, the poor are subject to the consensus of 
the middle and wealthier classes, along with the elites, constituting the majority of the 
population, who do not prioritize such concerns.  
 Uruguay’s inability to move away from torture is puzzling considering its success in 
consolidating democratic institutions. The judiciary is widely regarded as one of the best and 
                                                 
5
 See https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265832.pdf. 
  
6
 See https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265832.pdf. 
 
7
 See https://www.prison-insider.com/countryprofile/prisonsuru-en. 
 
8
 See https://www.prison-insider.com/countryprofile/prisonsuru-en. 
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most independent in all of Latin America (Rios-Figueroa 2006). 2014’s Rule of Law Index 
placed Uruguay 20
th
 out of 99 countries, 1 spot below that of the United States. Its criminal 
justice system ranked middle of the road, but this is in large part due to the legacy of the amnesty 
laws that are now defunct. Overall democratic institutions are held in high regard, and the fact 
that Frente Amplio won elections in 2005 has greatly reduced the link between the military and 
the ruling political party. 
 According to data collected by UNDP-LAPOP, Uruguay registers a public perception of 
police participation in crime of 32% and a trust in police score of 52.3 on a 0-100 scale. These 
scores firmly place Uruguay between Chile, which boasts the lowest public perception of police 
participation in crime and the highest trust in police score, and Argentina, registering the highest 
public perception of police participation in crime and the lowest trust in police score (UNDP-
LAPOP 2012). These findings are unsurprising considering Uruguayan society “is not plagued 
by drug trafficking, and homicide rates are among the lowest in the region” (Skaar 2015: 67). If 
Uruguay were to abandon its practices of preventive detention and torture, and it seems well 
within their capabilities, these numbers should only improve and challenge Chilean statistics.   
Chile 
 On September 11, 1973, the democratically-elected socialist Chilean president Salvador 
Allende was overthrown by a military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet. Pinochet became 
the military dictator of Chile, a position he held until 1990, following the plebiscite in 1988 in 
which the Chilean people voted to restore democratic elections. Under the Pinochet regime, 
28,000 people were tortured—predominantly young leftists supportive of or to the left of 
Allende’s Unidad Popular, as well as communists, academics, university students, union 
members and leadership, and working-class peasants. 
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 A brief analysis of the events, particularly in 1972 and 1973, in the build-up to the 
overthrow of Allende are in order. Beginning with the question of whether a military coup was 
inevitable in Chile, the answer must be negatory for the sheer reason that the possibility of a 
military coup never enjoyed much public support in Chile. In June of 1972, only 16.7% believed 
that “a military government is convenient for Chile,” and while this number did increase to 
25.7% by February of 1973, this number never climbed above 30% of the electorate. 
Unsurprisingly, this number was higher on the political right than the political left (35.4% to 
19.8%), but the fact still stands that the number never reached anywhere near a majority of 
Chileans (Navia and Osorio 2016: 5).  
 Indeed, one must wonder if these numbers were in the back of Allende’s mind when he 
made his political calculations. Surely a military coup could not occur in Chile because Chile 
was a democracy, and moreover the public did not desire it. Marxist author Ralph Miliband, in 
his fascinating, raw account entitled “The Coup in Chile,” written in October 1973, spends time 
musing on Allende’s decisions and what both he could have done differently and what lessons 
the international left could take from the episode. He points out that in March 1973 the Allende 
coalition actually increases its vote share, and it is at this time that the Right seriously considers a 
military coup. The Right proceeds to engage in economic sabotage, and by September 1973 
Allende proposes a plebiscite which would either provide the mandate for his presidency, in truth 
already provided by the March elections, or he would resign (Miliband 1973). 
  A particularly harrowing quote he employs to describe the brutality unleashed by the 
Pinochet military is from Sartre quoting de Goncourt in 1871, “It’s good. There has been no 
conciliation or compromise. The solution has been brutal. It has been pure force, a bloodletting 
such as this. By killing the militant part of the population puts off by a generation the new 
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revolution. It is twenty years of rest the old society has in front of it if the rulers dare all that 
needs to be dared at the moment” (de Goncourt 1871). De Goncourt’s 20 year estimation fits 
about rightly with the Chilean case: minimal leftist activity occurred on Chilean college 
campuses in the 1970s and 1980s, and union leadership was decimated. As public opinion data 
will later show, it takes about 20 years for Chileans to vociferously clamor for democracy, and 
an additional 20 before revolutionary calls for justice would permeate throughout a majority of 
the Chilean population.  
 As for the question of whether Allende could have altered his fate, Miliband is rather 
agnostic and noncommittal. Miliband is highly critical of Frei’s CDP, adding that “one 
understands better the savage contempt which Marx expressed for the bourgeois politicians he 
excoriated…the breed has not changed,” quite clearly suggesting that Allende stood a chance if 
the center did not abandon him. Allende’s unwillingness to arm his supporters and entertain civil 
war is examined as well, for Allende served as evidence of the paradoxical revolutionary with a 
steadfast commitment to nonviolence, “the blood of others horrified him,” adds Miliband 
(Miliband 1973). Where Miliband is most critical of Allende is in his inability to create “a 
parallel infrastructure” to counteract the one the Right was building, but ultimately it can only be 
concluded that Allende’s commitment to democracy and nonviolence, though noble, proved 
suicidal when the other side was willing to dare in the manner de Goncourt posited a century 
prior. 
 In 1973, support for the military government was strongest among those who identified 
with the right and those in the low middle class, while opposition to the military government was 
strongest among those who identified with the left and the middle class (Navia and Osorio 2016: 
10). The ideological divide is self-explanatory, but the fact that it was the lower middle class that 
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was more supportive of the military government than the middle middle class is somewhat 
surprising, if one was to assume that Allende’s support-base was strongest among the poor and 
lower middle classes. An alternative theory might well reveal then that Allende’s base was 
strongest amongst the poor, for economic reasons, and the middle middle class, in small part due 
to economic incentives but moreso due to a commitment to democracy. Meanwhile, as is often 
the case, the Right was able to coopt the lower middle class to align with the interests of the 
wealthy on the grounds of restoring order and punishing subversives.    
 Perceptions of the economy were also an expected strong predictor of support or 
opposition to military government in 1973, with those who assessed the economy most 
negatively more prone to support military government. Women were also more supportive of 
military government than men, which comes as no surprise given Allende’s well-documented 
struggles to court women voters and the persistently conservative values of Chilean women more 
generally (Navia and Osorio 2016: 10-11).  
The Chilean military still wielded substantial influence at the time of transition, and it is 
not until Pinochet stepped down as the head of the armed forces in 1998 that the army was 
“safely back in the barracks” and policy regarding human rights could be pursued without fear of 
retaliation (Skaar 2010: 13). Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) assumed the Chilean presidency 
immediately following the transition, and although he was receptive to the strong human rights 
movement in Chile, he inherited the self-amnesty law proclaimed by Pinochet and the military, 
and therefore was unable to make substantial unilateral headway on the human rights issue. 
While the courts retained independence immediately following the transition, according to 
Skaar’s metrics they did not have a liberal or activist disposition under Aylwin and therefore 
only pursued a single trial in the Letelier-Moffitt case (Skaar 2010: 15). The court was packed to 
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be Pinochet-friendly by the outgoing military dictatorship, so while they can be classified as 
independent in the sense that there was no law prohibiting their ability to prosecute, for all 
intents and purposes they were non-independent and in the corner of Pinochet and the military. 
Aguilar and Hite contend that the upholding of the 1978 amnesty law “reflected the 
Concertacion’s calculation that it did not possess the force in government to confront those 
responsible for gross human rights violations” (Aguilar and Hite 2004). This is fair but implies 
the Concertacion possessed the agency to make a calculation in the first place: repealing the 
amnesty law via democratic means is impractical when a coalition is constitutionally barred from 
doing so and the courts are packed. 
 Heiss raises criticisms of the Concertacion that ascertain they gave up “too much, too 
quick, to demands of the military and political right…to ensure compliance by their opponents to 
the new rules of the game” (Heiss 2003: 29). This perspective, though, under appreciates that the 
rules of the game were written by the side that owned the constitution, courts, military, and had 
already shown in the past that it would wage a coup against someone in Allende who had 
increased the government coalition’s vote share in March of 1973 and was still willing to hold a 
plebiscite in September of 1973 to gauge his legitimacy to appease the right. Hindsight bias 
suggests the center-left could have been less conciliatory to the right in 1973, one could even 
argue that very case for Allende, but limited opportunities presented themselves in 1990 for the 
center-left to necessarily take a stand against a faction with so much power and, by design, 
legitimacy. 
 Heiss further considers the idea that “political elites are almost obsessed with consensus 
building, [and] an undercurrent of violence and a sense of injustice remain latent in Chilean 
society” (Heiss 2003: 29). Indeed, a common perspective shared across the international left is 
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that the bipartisan consensus can be pursued by the elites at the expense of all else—namely 
policy gains and a greater sense of justice. Contemporary Democratic Party elites are criticized 
by the left for their insistence that there are noble Republicans, for instance. Again, however, in 
the Chilean case, while it is a reasonable criticism that the center-left’s desire for a bipartisan 
consensus ultimately lost Chile its democracy in 1973, the context of 1990 is entirely different. 
There are opportunities when consensus building is a choice, but in 1990 this simply was not 
such a case.    
 The Pinochet regime not only ensured the military would stay powerful post-transition, 
they also “guaranteed a budget ensuring operational autonomy and high salaries for their 
officers” (Huntington 1993). Such a tactic is shrewd insofar as the military is protected from 
fluctuations in the national economy as well as budget cuts that could entice officials to retire or 
pursue a career change. A paid military is a happy military, unified and loyal to those who 
brokered their deal; the chance of a coup is reduced when they lack the financial incentives to 
instill change, but equally so it creates a situation whereby it is very difficult to hold such a 
powerful institution accountable for past abuses. The military is still perceived as the most 
powerful institution in Chile by both supporters and opponents of the military alike (Linz and 
Stepan 1996: 224). Coupled with a social base that was sympathetic to and the economic 
beneficiaries of Pinochet and his neoliberal policies, along with a media including the paper of 
record in the conservative El Mercurio that aided Pinochet as he consolidated power in 1973, 
human rights activists were rather hamstrung in the early 1990s. 
 Heiss, writing in 2003, sees this budgetary autonomy along with the institutional 
constraints of the 1980 Constitution as key reasons as to why “civilian control over the military 
and security forces has not been achieved” (Heiss 2003: 26). Her pessimism continues in her 
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verdict that “the ideal of a shared truth, set by the Rettig Commission, has not been achieved” 
(Heiss 2003: 27). Those more sympathetic to Pinochet will not deny that human rights abuses 
took place, but they will attribute police and military excess to what amounts to a natural 
consequence of fighting a “war” against communism. It is unclear what more can be done to 
change intransigent public opinion that adopts Pinochet’s thinking: sectors that benefited under 
Pinochet expectedly hold more favorable views of his legacy, but also Chileans coming of age in 
the late 1970s and the bulk of the 1980s are tasked with overcoming an education gap as 
universities were also packed with Pinochet appointees to spread his message. When a society’s 
labor radicals are purged and the public is indoctrinated in the media and university system, 
counterhegemonic forces are at a severe disadvantage.  
 It was not until the “Mesa de Dialogo” in 1999 that the military acknowledged the 
committing of any crimes under the dictatorship. But even in this instance the relatives of victims 
and the communist party considered this to be a case of the military attempting to stop judicial 
proceedings of conspicuous cases of disappearances. In this respect, the talks “became more a 
political protection for human rights violators than an advance towards obtaining more 
information” (Heiss 2003: 10). This remains a peculiar aspect of the Chilean case: the amnesty 
law is only invoked when the location of the victim is known. Thus, paradoxically, “persons 
whose whereabouts and circumstances of death were hidden to avoid judiciary consequences 
became…the way to circumvent the Amnesty Law” (Heiss 2003: 21). Guilty military officials, 
then, have had incentives to candidly disclose the location of disappeared if their trust in the 
amnesty law’s application had not waivered, or in a best-case scenario their victim’s location 
could be disclosed anonymously. 
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 The 1990 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, more commonly referred to as the 
Rettig Report, was also limited in scope by design. Abandoning judiciary action, the commission 
only sought to establish a shared account of the past. As Heiss recounts, “justice was left to the 
tribunals,” who duly closed cases without investigating (Heiss 2003: 7). The report to its credit 
was extensive, investigating 3,400 cases and disclosing the general circumstances of each case, 
though it infamously did not disclose the identities of individual perpetrators.     
 Eduardo Frei (1994-2000) and Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) did not favor trials, but a 
liberal/activist judiciary ensured trials would carry on anyway, and then in the case of Michelle 
Bachelet (2006-2010), expectedly as someone who favored trials with a still liberal/activist 
judiciary, trials occurred at a rapid pace with executive and judiciary on the same page. From a 
human rights perspective, it is highly encouraging that judiciaries were able to overcome 
opposing executives under the tenures of both Frei and Lagos. 1998 once again stands out as a 
key year in Chile as, in addition to Pinochet stepping down, “the Supreme Court reform brought 
more liberal-minded justices to the Court and created a special chamber for criminal cases” 
(Skaar 2010: 19).  
 Following the amnesty law put in place in 1978 which initially precluded military 
prosecution at the time of transition as well, from the mid-1990s onwards, Chilean judges 
increasingly prosecuted the military. In addition, constitutional reforms allowed for judicial 
independence that eluded Uruguay for some time longer, for example. By the end of 2000, 
Chilean courts had convicted just 28 people for human rights violations, but this number shot up 
to 296 convictions between 2000 and 2010 (Hilbink 2007, Universidad Diego Portales 2010). As 
of 2010, Skaar contends that Chile “is the country that has made the most progress in holding the 
military to account for its past abuses” (Skaar 2010: 3).  
43 
 
 The National Corporation for Reparations and Reconciliation was created in 1992. Heiss 
notes that “Chile’s transitional justice is notorious for the amount of reparations,” and she details 
some of the many forms of reparations including life-long pensions, educational benefits, 
psychological services, and exemptions from military service” (Heiss 2003: 4, Kritz 1995: 
xxxvii). Chilean exiles have also requested double citizenship, and Lagos’ government did 
propose legislation for this, but the proposal was rejected by the right who operated under the 
logical assumption this would increase the left’s vote share in national elections (Heiss 2003: 
22).  
 The Chilean human rights community was organized by the Catholic Church under the 
umbrella of the Vicariate of Solidarity, Vicaria. The Vicaria took action over a high proportion 
of extrajudicial executions and suspected disappearances (Collins 2010: 69). Generally speaking, 
human rights lawyers were committed but under resourced. Collins recounts one senior lawyer 
who felt the human rights community should have gone hard after Pinochet and the military 
immediately following Rettig, but refrained from doing so because “everyone had just bought 
into the notion that something like that was unthinkable” (Collins 2010: 73). Collins is quick, 
however, to point out that the first direct challenge to the amnesty law post-transition only 
produced a hardening in the courts, and right-wing members of Congress had effective veto-
power in Congress. 
 In 1997, as pointed out by Gillis, “the Supreme Court increased from 17 to 21 members 
and there was mandatory retirement for judges over the age of 75” (Gillis 2015: 13). This was a 
crucial development as only 4 of the 17 original Pinochet appointees remained in place 
thereafter, and “the military also saw the retirement of all generals closely tied to Pinochet and 
the dictatorship” (Gillis 2015: 13).  
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 Collins credits minority civil actors with justice developments in Chile since 1998, as 
opposed to the seemingly reasonable assumption that prosecutions were sparked by a “renewed 
state determination to act against impunity” (Collins 2010: 86). She finds that state response in 
Chile has “generally oscillated between indifference and active dissuasion,” so in this regard 
clashes with Skaar who would contend Aylwin and Bachelet were decidedly pro-trial (Collins 
2010: 86). Given this conclusion, private endeavors are what get results in the post-transitional 
realm, and her skeptical view of executive state action is in line with grassroots left Chilean 
thinking that has been disillusioned by the Concertacion’s approach to the memory issue.    
 Chilean public opinion with particular respect to support for military prosecutions will be 
considered, but Stern’s estimate of 45-50% support for the military dictatorship in the late 1970s 
is a useful baseline to begin an assessment of Chilean public opinion. Stern reaches this number 
by combining an analysis of the 1980 constitutional reform vote results accounting for fraud, and 
a commonsensical assessment of the Chilean electorate in the 1960s and 1970s which placed 
roughly a third of Chileans on the political Left, Center, and Right respectively. Operating with 
the understanding Pinochet lost about half of the Centrist/Christian Democratic base, due to 
social tragedy and policy critiques, by the late 1970s, this allows Stern to arrive at the number of 
just shy of or equal to 50% (Stern 2006: 437).  
 By 1983, there were clear signs that Pinochet’s support was waning. Loveman references 
a public opinion survey conducted by the Chilean weekly Hoy which found that, by 1983, 21.6% 
of respondents believed that the best government formula for solving national problems was the 
current one, 15% preferred a government without Pinochet but including military participation or 
directed by a leading Rightist politician, 24.2% desired a new government formed by the 
opposition but without communists, and 22.7% preferred a new government formed by 
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opposition elements without exclusions (Loveman 1986: 4, Hoy 1983: 15). Generously, taking 
half of the 15% who preferred the Right and military in charge but not necessarily Pinochet as 
still generally supportive, this is suggestive of Pinochet having about 30% of public backing or at 
least a 20% drop in support from the late 1970s roughly 5 years earlier. Such an assessment is 
further corroborated by the fact that almost 60% of respondents favored “reestablishment of full 
democracy” by 1985 and over 75% of respondents favored said reestablishment before 1989 
(Hoy 1983: 15). According to Navia and Osorio, “after the end of the dictatorship in 1990, 
support for democracy has stabilized at around 60% (since 1995, when Latinobarometro first 
asked the question), but views on the military government have become increasingly negative” 
(Navia and Osorio 2016: 5). 
 Loveman argues, and the survey data assuredly backs, that “the Constitution of 1980 
enjoyed little domestic support from the majority of Chileans, and that it could not survive much 
beyond Pinochet himself” (Loveman 1986: 4). The Latin American School of Social Sciences 
(FLACSO) conducted national and Santiago polls throughout the 1980s and their findings 
largely echo Stern, Loveman, and Navia and Osorio: in 1985, 13.3% of Chileans believed that 
authoritarianism was sometimes desirable, while 57.5% believed that democracy should be the 
preferable form of government (Baño 1993). Five additional polls between 1986 and 1989 
showed “stable low support for authoritarianism and high support for democracy,” and in 1987, 
when asked if authoritarianism or democracy would do a better job on several dimensions, 
Chileans believed democracy would do a better job in 11 of 12 domains (Baño 1993: 11). Some 
standout areas where democracy was preferred to authoritarianism include: reducing 
unemployment (64%), improving Chile’s image abroad (63.1%), reducing social inequalities 
(58.9%), and fostering economic development (57.7%). Authoritarian governments ranked their 
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highest—but still worse than democracies—in eliminating terrorism (21.2%) and securing public 
order (21.7%) (Navia and Osorio 2016: 11-12). The 1987 survey additionally found that 66.5% 
believed that a democratically-elected government was superior to any other form of 
government, a number that held approximately constant at 65.8% in 1989 (Baño 1993: 11). 
     Just as perceptions of the economy predicted support for military rule in 1973, the 
1987 FLACSO poll found that economic concerns were more important than human rights 
concerns in criticisms of the military regime. While 21.2% of Chileans mentioned human rights 
violations as a concerning aspect of the dictatorship, more than double, 43%, mentioned 
unemployment. In terms of positive accomplishments, 30.4% mentioned alleviating extreme 
poverty, both the most common accomplishment referenced and well above secondary references 
such as fighting communism (13.6%), modernizing the country (11.7%), and security/order 
(9.8%). Notably, 26.2% said the dictatorship had no accomplishments—a number that roughly 
mirrors a Chilean left that never bought into Pinochet’s human rights approach and neoliberal 
policies (FLACSO 1988: 14, Navia and Osorio 2016: 12). Consistently, economic perception 
outweighed all other concerns for the Chilean population. 
 A 1986 poll from the Center for Studies of Contemporary Reality (CERC), confined to 
just Santiago residents, found “strong support for democracy (69.7%), low support for the 
continuation of the Pinochet government (13.2%), and even lower support for dictatorship 
(5.2%)” (Huneeus 1987: 63, Navia and Osorio 2016: 12). Recalling the Hoy 1983 nationwide 
survey which put support for the Pinochet government at 21.6%, it is reasonable to conclude that 
Pinochet’s support continued to wane as the 1980s progressed, and by the end of his reign he 
certainly enjoyed no more than 20% of nationwide support, and perhaps lower—unless 
Santiago’s support for Pinochet by 1986 drastically differed from the nation at large. That 
47 
 
Santiago’s support for democracy came in at a whopping 70% suggests that the city tilted 
marginally to the left of the nation at large, in fact support for democracy among leftists was 
around 90% contrasted by 50% of those on the extreme right supporting authoritarianism and 
Pinochet, but it is also worth remembering that all of these surveys found support for democracy 
to be around or north of 60% throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Huneeus 1987: 64).  
 Lest one overestimate anti-Pinochet sentiment near the time of transition, a 1987 poll also 
conducted in Santiago paints the picture of a mostly indifferent populace: 12.5% supported the 
government, 29.1% were opponents, and 47.9% identified as independents. Upon moving half of 
political independents to the government supporter’s column, a reasonable thing to do to predict 
the vote share in a hypothetical 1987 referendum, he would get over a third of the vote—
admittedly largely consisting of tepid supporters. The same poll also found that 20.6% of 
respondents had a lot of interest in politics compared to 37.3% that said they had little interest 
and 41.1% that declared to have no interest at all—reflective of a society that has long had and 
maintained a relative disinterest in politics, but also a glowing endorsement of Pinochet’s efforts 
to remove political debate from public life (FLACSO 1987: 17, Navia and Osorio 2016: 12-13). 
 Furthermore, the 1988 FLACSO poll points to a polarized assessment of the Pinochet 
government: on a 1-7 scale, the lowest scores (1-2) received 35.6% support, 28.5% gave a 3-4, 
and 30.5% gave a 5 or higher (FLACSO 1988: 16). While these numbers also point to a clear 
minority of citizens as overwhelmingly supportive of Pinochet, they perchance actually 
challenge that Pinochet enjoyed support well south of 30% by the time of the 1988 referendum. 
 Overall depoliticization under the military dictatorship appears to have had an effect on 
Chileans’ political views: by 1988, 58.8% did not identify with a political party while only 
33.2% did. Moreover, while the ideological breakdown roughly consisted of the three thirds prior 
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to the dictatorship, as contended by Stern and several others, by 1988 64.4% defined themselves 
as close to the center—with only 7.3% choosing left and 5.5% choosing right (Navia and Osorio 
2016: 14). Navia and Osorio’s overall conclusions are that there is sufficient evidence that 
democratic values did not decrease under the dictatorship, and that low support for the 
dictatorship by the end of the 1980s was due more to economic concerns than human rights 
violations. Bearing these findings in mind, it is plausible that Chileans were successfully able to 
restore democracy due to the very fact that the population always remained highly supportive of 
it even in its absence.  
 Navia and Osorio also point to trends in Latinobarometro polls conducted regularly since 
1995: support for democracy has been stable and above 60% while support for authoritarianism 
remains below 20% and has marginally decreased since the early 1990s. LAPOP surveys 
between 2006 and 2012 find that 3 of every 4 Chileans believe democracy to be the most 
preferable form of government. LAPOP’s number did drop to 59.9% in 2008, but this is likely 
attributable to worldwide economic crisis. Altogether, this consistent 55%-75% support for 
democracy in Chile since the 1970s has proven to be incredibly consistent, and recent surveys 
suggest that overall this number is gradually continuing to rise. Also between 2006 and 2012, 
less than 10% of Chileans agreed with the assessment that they needed a strong leader not 
elected democratically—14.5% in 2008 once again serving as the outlier (Navia and Osorio 
2016: 14). 
Stern also references widespread Chilean public support for the Valech Report, a record 
of abuses committed by the military regime. Serving as a call for “historical and political 
justice,” the 2004 report was supported by 74% of Chileans. Furthermore, 86% found the 
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findings and victim testimonies truthful, constituting what amounts to a shared truth throughout 
society (Stern 2010: 299). 
Since the CERC began asking Chileans about their views on the September 11, 1973 
coup, a majority of Chileans consistently believe the coup destroyed democracy, and positive 
views of the military coup have declined over time. In the mid-1990s, a third of respondents 
believed the coup liberated Chile from Marxism, but by 2013 less than 20% concurred with mid-
1990s opinion. The emotional impact of the coup on the Chilean people was also on display in 
their response to survey questions in the early-mid-1990s: 30% associated it with pain, 12% with 
indignation, and 18% with impotence (Huneeus 2003: 37). While 33% believed the coup 
“belongs in the past and has lost importance in the present,” 49% disagreed with this assessment. 
In all polls between 1990 and 2003, more than 50% of respondents believed that “there was a 
civil war in 1973 that forced the military to use a heavy hand” (Navia and Osorio 2016: 14). 
 Chilean public opinion on the period of military dictatorship has evolved rapidly over the 
course of the 21
st
 century. In 2003, 36% of Chileans believed that the military had good reasons 
to stage the coup of September 11
th
, 1973, but a mere 10 years later, in 2013, just 16% of 
Chileans were supportive of this viewpoint (Navia and Osorio 2016: 5). This drop in support is a 
rather remarkable testament to efforts to publicize the abuses of the dictatorship as well as to the 
Chilean populace who were willing to let new information that had come to light influence their 
perspective on a polarizing past.    
 In regards to contemporary public opinion in Chile on support for democracy, a 2010 
national opinion poll found that “12.09% of the population believed that a coup by the armed 
forces would be justified” (Gillis 2015: 3). Gillis also discusses a phenomena raised by legislator 
Guillermo Teillier who has stated that the Congress is full of legislators who “idolize Pinochet” 
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and defend the coup (Montes 2014). This assertion is compounded by the fact that, on the 40
th
 
anniversary of the coup, President Pinera claimed that the coup was a “predictable outcome” 
caused by Allende’s “violations of the rule of law” (Serrano 2013, Gillis 2015: 3). Pinera’s 
statements are simply false, but the more concerning aspect of these developments is that there 
are still elites that harbor strong pro-Pinochet, coup-apologist sentiments. Assuming they have a 
political base who listens to them, they can still wage influence, and possibly foment soft 
authoritarian support.    
LAPOP’s 2012 poll also provides insight. 19% of respondents responded that it did not 
matter if the regime were democratic or non-democratic, while 72.7% believed that democracy is 
preferable to any other form of government. Only 8.3% declared that, under some circumstances, 
an authoritarian government could be preferable (Navia and Osorio 2016: 15). 
Chilean public perception of police participation in crime is the lowest in the region at 
15.38%, and their trust in police is the highest in the region at 65.7 on a 0-100 scale. The 
citizenry’s high confidence in Chile’s Carabineros is a key component to Chile’s reputation as a 
leading democracy in the region, and high trust runs counter to any expectation that the Chilean 
police force still bears responsibility for the crimes committed by the Pinochet regime in the eyes 
of the public. 
 Scandals do have the potential to erode the gains that police and military have made. In 
2016, the military “which is considered to be less corrupt than the police, according to a public 
survey,” endured a case of internal fraud in which officials misused over $8 million in funds. The 
police, similarly, have faced backlash for the “revelations that a corrupt network syphoned 




 A series of military juntas ruled Argentina from 1976-1983, and in the process the juntas 
disappeared over 30,000 people. In 1983, the National Commission on the Disappeared 
(CONADEP) was created by presidential decree, and its findings “confirmed the disappearance 
of 8,693 people, acknowledged the existence of 340 clandestine torture centres, and listed the 
names of 11,351 people including doctors, judges, journalists, bishops, and priests, who had co-
operated with repression (Barahona De Brito 2001: 121). Thus, CONADEP differed from 
Chile’s Rettig Report with respect to the fact that it did not cloak perpetrators in anonymity. The 
government also annulled the military’s self-amnesty law in 1983, opening the door for 
prosecutions.  In 1985, nine former members of the juntas were prosecuted, including former 
presidents Jorge Rafael Videla (1976-1981) and Roberto Eduardo Viola (1981). However, by 
1985 the government “faced a process…it could not control or limit so…it tried for the first time 
to limit prosecutions,” a decision which led to widespread public outrage and protest (Ernudd 
2006: 17).  
 Argentina was one of the first countries in the world to “prosecute its own military in 
national courts for excesses and abuses committed during the so-called “Dirty War”” (Skaar 
2010: 2). Its transition is distinguishable from Chile and Uruguay because it was brought about 
by military collapse and not the ballot box. In accord, due to explicit military defeat, “it [was] 
considered practically possible to suggest holding the military to account” (Skaar 2010: 7). 
Argentina began “prosecuting their military at the moment of their lowest legitimacy, following 
the defeat in the Falklands war,” but, following confrontations between the government and 
military, the Full stop law was implemented in 1985 to shield military officials from further 
prosecutions (Ernudd 2006: 9). Like Chile, Argentina increasingly prosecuted military officials 
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from the mid-1990s onwards and reformed their judicial systems via constitutional reforms 
(Skaar 2010: 4). Skaar credits the constitutional reform of 1994 with “broadening the scope for 
judicial review” (Skaar 2010: 19). A landmark ruling by Judge Cavallo in 2001 “was the first to 
declare the amnesty laws invalid, arguing that the violations committed during the dirty war, 
were of “sufficient gravity and scale” to be exempt of the statues of limitations” (di Paolantonio 
2004). And in 2003 the Argentine Supreme Court ruled that “protecting military personnel from 
prosecutions was unconstitutional” (ICTJ). As of 2010, more than 800 accused faced criminal 
charges, and 200 have been sentenced (ICTJ).     
 Argentine military uprisings are an integral part of the story, as there were several of 
them under both Alfonsin and Menem. Democracy was not overthrown in its fragile early stages, 
and it is worth appreciating in hindsight that this was not guaranteed, but the uprisings were very 
much effective in achieving policy gains. For example, “following the Easter Week Rebellion of 
April 1987 the government enacted the due obedience laws, which precluded further 
prosecutions of active duty officers for human rights violations” (Huntington 1993). Alfonsin 
closed avenues of criminal accountability due to military agitation, and ensuing president 
Menem pardoned convicted junta members (ICTJ).  
Such realities undermine the reductionist account of the Argentine transitional justice 
story which claims the military was incredibly weak and therefore held little to no sway; the 
military was battered and vulnerable, but still very much could mobilize to put pressure on the 
government to adopt policies that aligned with its interests. With this being said, the Argentine 
military was still at a severe disadvantage relative to Chile’s military: state crises and economic 
fluctuations did affect the Argentine military’s budget, and any institution that is not protected 
from economic fluctuation nor guaranteed high salaries is weakened at the negotiation table. The 
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military’s budget, personnel, and political influence decreased under the Alfonsin and Menem 
administrations, and the four failed military uprisings only further exacerbated the military’s 
descent (Mora et al. 2017: 27).  
 Malamud-Goti argues that “trials conducted under the Alfonsin presidency were 
misguided since they focused solely on the military” (Ernudd 2006: 20). In his estimation this 
disregarded other important complicit actors including the “Catholic Church, right-wing 
vigilante groups, the Peronist Alianza Argentina Anti-comunista, the Montoneros, and the ERP” 
Ernudd 2006: 20). This a noteworthy critique as this one-dimensional focus on the military could 
help explain contemporary distrust in the Argentine military; alternatively, if the government had 
spread the blame proportionally, perhaps the military would have more legitimacy and blame-
assessment at large would be assigned in a more nuanced manner by the public. Typically 
disproportional blame assessment is a leftist critique laid upon conservative regimes who purport 
“two demons” or “symmetry of guilt” narratives that equate widespread state abuse with minimal 
grassroots retaliation, for example, but the Argentine instance serves as a case whereby one 
primary actor in state abuse is given disproportional attention at the expense of other people and 
institutions complicit in state abuse. 
 Skaar finds that the first Argentine president following transition, Raul Alfonsin (1983-
1989), initially favored limited prosecutions but later rescinded this policy position and 
attempted to “severely restrict prosecutions once they occurred on a larger scale than 
anticipated” (Skaar 2010: 15). Trials continued despite Alfonsin’s policy reversal, and Skaar 
contends this is due to the liberal/activist disposition of the independent Argentine courts. 
Indeed, court disposition trumped executive attitudes in Argentina just as it did in Chile under 
trial-averse Frei and Lagos: President Carlos Menem (1989-1999) was on par with the 
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Uruguayan Sanguinetti in terms of being the staunchest of anti-trial presidents across the three 
countries, and Argentine courts still were able to conduct trials during his second term (despite 
his packing of the courts and pardoning of military officials). Trials continued under 
nonreceptive Fernando de la Rua (1999-2001) and Eduardo Duhalde (2002-2003). And trials 
also occurred under pro-trial Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007) and his successor Cristina Fernandez 
de Kirchner (2007-2015), although, at times during the Kirchner administrations, overwhelmed 
justices were unable or unwilling to conduct trials in a speedy manner (classified by Skaar as 
“slow trials”) (Skaar 2010: 15).  
 Grassroots pressure in Argentina to hold perpetrators of state violence accountable has 
been significant. Escraches, public demonstrations aimed at drawing attention to officials guilty 
of human rights abuses through social condemnation, serve to “challenge the notion…that by 
silencing the past Argentines could achieve reconciliation and their democracy would be 
fortified” (Vaisman 2017: 371). Human rights activists have been critical of what they refer to as 
a “continuity of the judicial apparatus of the dictatorship,” a reference to specific judges who 
consistently rule in favor of the genocidas. Activists contend that “impunity for past crimes is 
tied to…the basic structures of the repressive apparatus that were constructed before and 
developed during the dictatorial rule” (Vaisman 2017: 379). Such claims argue that institutions 
are still embedded with elites or norms that stymie justice, and while certain justices are singled 
out it is the police as an institution that activists argue serve as evidence for their thesis. Given 
that activists believe individuals within the police force still act as they did under dictatorship, it 
then follows that trust in police lags behind the military and several other institutions.   
 There are alternative reasons as to why trust in police lags in Argentina, however. 
Following transition, from 1983-1989, “the rate of crime and the rate of intentional homicides 
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recorded by police institutions increased by 73% and 85%, respectively” (Quirós 2017: 93). 
While Quirós goes on to note that the Argentine government opted to deepen democratic 
institutions in response rather than answer fears of crime with punitiveness, a response that at 
first glance is measured and altogether positive, there is the possibility that segments of the 
public that are more supportive of punitive measures to reduce crime held the police responsible 
for refusing to adopt such measures. The government did eventually cave to adopting punitive 
measures, however, as the federal prison population increased by 52% between 1989 and 1995, 
while the crime rate continued to grow constantly between 1985 and 2002 (Quirós 2017: 95).  
Taking these developments into account, it is unlikely that the public is critical of the 
police for its inconsistency regarding adopting punitive versus nonpunitive measures, but rather 
that neither approach was successful in deterring crime between 1983 and 2002. Malone (2012) 
notes how “surges in violent crime [across Latin America] has hampered efforts to reform the 
rule of law,” and this undoubtedly applies to the Argentine case as well where “institutional 
inability to confront crime successfully has lead many citizens to dismiss them as hopelessly 
ineffective and corrupt” (Malone 2012: 15-6).  Sozzo (2011) argues that the collective memory 
of state crimes of the dictatorship in Argentina makes it very difficult to promote claims of open 
punitiveness toward ordinary criminality, but Quirós’ analysis would suggest the record is 
decidedly mixed: post-dictatorship, more and less punitive approaches have both been adopted at 
various points. Either way, rising crime rates undermine public trust in justice institutions, and 
make it nearly impossible for reformers to implement effective rule of law practices or for the 
public to buy into the idea that the state is sincerely committed to doing so. 
 Bonner finds that 213 people were disappeared and 4,100 people were shot or tortured to 
death by Argentine security forces between 1983 and 2013, and that such cases have steadily 
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increased since the return to electoral democracy (Bonner 2014: 235-6). His assessment of the 
police force is largely negative: police practices from the dictatorship have continued, attempts at 
police reform have been “ineffective or ephemeral or both, and police impunity remains high” 
(Bonner 2014: 236). Further, there is a common link between the victims under the dictatorship 
and now post-transition: “those who oppose or are marginalized by neoliberalism are the most 
common victims of state violence” (Bonner 2014: 246). Following this logic, while the sheer 
quantity of victims have been reduced, the underlying systemic oppressor-oppressed dynamic 
has not necessarily been altered, and this can be conceived as a shortcoming of the state. Seri and 
Kubal argue that the Kirchner administrations have more closely tied human rights to security in 
their rhetoric, but this has actually facilitated the continuation, even gradual escalation, of police 
violence (Seri and Kubal 2013).  
 Related to Seri and Kubal’s musings on neoliberalism, the class dynamic to the Argentine 
story is essential to a holistic analysis. Like in Chile, the vast majority of victims were under 30 
years old (70.78%), and indeed most were under 25, but nearly 70% (69.8%) were middle 
class—mostly from Buenos Aires (CONADEP). This runs counter to expectations that targets 
would consist of the working poor, but what is further so compelling is that “traditionally, the 
middle class supported military coups in Argentina and military coups happened in defense of 
the interests of the middle class” (Bonner 2014: 251). Thus, a rather confounding situation 
existed where the military was quite literally targeting the youth of its support-base. In 
contemporary Argentina, police primarily target the poor, particularly men and those with a 
darker complexion, much more in line with expectations. The security apparatus has then 
effectively reframed the “other,” and chosen an “other” who appeals much more to its natural 
middle class and wealthy base. Indeed, the police’s transition from targeting the middle class to 
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targeting the poor could explain gains in police trust, in the sense that they are performing more 
in line with traditional expectations.  
 Seri discusses a phenomenon that suggests this stratagem is very much a conscious one 
on the part of hegemonic forces: mainstream media presents “a narrative of middle class victims 
and of shantytown residents as criminals” because police journalists and editors believe this to be 
“the best manner to reach their target or largest audience possible” (Seri 2012, Bonner 2014: 
253). Nun reasons the middle class has supported coups because it is not a “well-integrated 
hegemonic group” and therefore fears popular movements; since crime threatens their economic 
gains (under dictatorship but also more broadly under all periods of neoliberalism), and the 
military is perceived as a delegitimized institution that betrayed the middle class under 
dictatorship, the middle class turns to the police to be the protector of their interests (Bonner 
2010: 253). Admittedly this line of argumentation presupposes the middle class is very much 
conscious of the fact that their youth were the targets of the dictatorship, and this perspective 
would contradict overall survey data that suggests the military is held in higher regard than the 
police, but then again support levels for these institutions could break down along class lines. In 
other words, Nun’s proposition could be corroborated by much higher middle class trust in the 
police relative to the poor; alternatively, the poor would trust the military far more than the 
middle class.  
Similar to accounts regarding reduced resources being granted to the military following 
transition, Alfonsin decreased police resources, although he also sought to “improve police 
training and tighten internal discipline” (Bonner 2014: 241). But this policy approach is hardly 
constant amongst Argentine elites, and there are leaders willing to reverse or limit police reforms 
in order to pivot in a more iron-fist direction. One such example is Daniel Scioli who was elected 
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governor of Buenos Aires in 2007 while running on a platform of reversing police reforms 
enacted by his predecessor (Bonner 2014: 249).  
 According to the 2012 UNDP-LAPOP survey, 44.4% of Argentine citizens have the 
perception that police participate in crime, a higher rate than both Chile and Uruguay and a 
middling rate by Latin American standards, and Argentine trust in police at 43.3 on a 0-100 scale 
is lower than both Chile and Uruguay and also middling by Latin American standards (UNDP-
LAPOP 2012). This survey result is in line with a survey undertaken by Latino Barometro in 
1995: “fewer [Argentine] citizens than in any other country in the Southern Cone believe that the 
military is still powerful” and “the least wanted and trusted military is in Argentina” (Ernudd 
2006: 21).  
 Mora et al. find reason to be optimistic in the military’s favorability. While they cite 
Argentine military favorability at 42% in 2001-2002, on par with trust in the police in 2012, they 
note that this is the highest favorability rating for the military since 1983. They attribute this rise 
in favorability to “the military show[ing] no propensity to interfere or influence political 
outcomes” even amidst the economic and political crisis of 2001-02 (Mora et al. 2017: 5). They 
also find an urban-rural divide in military favorability with rural areas more favorable to the 
military than urban areas (Mora et al. 2017: 26). 
 AmericasBarometer in 2008 found that trust in the military was 36%, and that 40% 
believed the armed forces respected human rights. Mora et al. attribute these low percentages to 
the “constant harassment and blaming of the military for all the country’s ills and accusations of 
human rights violations against retired officers” during the Kirchner era. LAPOP’s 2012 survey, 
however, found that 51% of the Argentine population trusted the military and 55% believed the 
armed forces respected human rights, which represents a substantial increase from 
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AmericasBarometer’s 2008 findings. AmericasBarometer’s 2012 survey reports similarly: 55% 
of Argentines reported that they felt the military was doing a good job (Mora et al. 2017: 28). 
Comparing police and military directly, according to 2012 data, the military is trusted roughly 


















CHAPTER 4: EVALUATION OF SURVEY DATA AND NATIONAL DIFFERENCES 
In this section, I begin each analysis by stating my hypotheses for each of the 15 chosen 
questions from the 2012 LAPOP survey (broken up between four thematic categories). I will 
then discuss the results for each of the selected questions. Of particular interest will be 
statistically significant deviations between the countries. In order to determine statistical 
significance, I conducted Independent Samples t tests, which compare the means of each of the 
countries for each question. In cases where there is statistically significant difference, I will 
argue, based upon my background research and qualitative overview, why there is an observable 
difference. Most intriguing will be instances in which my statistical findings diverge from my 
original hypotheses that took into account the qualitative story. For such cases, there are clearly 
variables at play impacting public opinion which even a thorough qualitative analysis does not 
effectively predict; I will best argue why said phenomena is observed. 
Category I: Support for Authoritarian Measures 
 In predicting support for a coup due to unemployment, a useful starting point is to 
consider the countries’ unemployment rates. The unemployment rate is below 10% in each of 
these cases and, compared to other countries in Latin America, economic indicators in these 
countries are strong. While economic incentives encouraged affluent sectors to generally ascent 
to military coups in the past, these economic incentives are not currently present. For poorer 
sectors, the military has rarely been a friend, and they are not hurting as much as they could be 
either during an economic downturn. There also has not been a coup in the Southern Cone for 




H1: There will be no statistically significant difference between the countries regarding 
support for a coup due to high unemployment. Support will be low across the cases.  
 
Graph 1: Support for a Coup d’état due to High Unemployment 
 
 
 None of the Southern Cone countries are particularly supportive of a coup d’état due to 
high unemployment—an encouraging sign, for if any of these countries were to be highly 
supportive of a coup due to high unemployment then any economic downturn would pose a 
significant threat to democracy. Most notably, there is a statistically significant difference 
between support for a coup due to high unemployment between Argentina and Chile: though a 
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substantial majority of both countries’ citizenry are not supportive of a coup due to high 
unemployment, Argentines are more likely than Chileans to support such action.  
 One possible explanation for this statistically significant divergence between Argentina 
and Chile is that Chile registers the lowest percentage of respondents who report food insecurity 
(7.9%), whereas Argentina registers a more middling number of 14.3% (Uruguay is at 11.5%) 
(Seligson et al. 2012: 25). Insofar as food insecurity is felt more palpably, it could be the case 
that this increases support for democratic alternatives such as coups to address one of the 
primary causes of food insecurity: unemployment. 
 Regarding predicting support for a coup due to high crime, Chile’s comparatively more 
successful institutional reforms, particularly with regard to its police which is broadly trusted by 
society, will allow for the public to entrust them with combating any crime endemic. Crime is 
comparatively low in Chile as is, but, even if crime were to rise with high levels, Chileans will 
believe they have the institutions to effectively combat it without resorting to a response as 
drastic as a military coup. And in the present, Chileans may well attribute their low crime rate to 
its successful institutions and institutional reform process. In their estimation, why uproot a 
framework that is working effectively? 
 
H2: There will be a statistically significant difference between Chile and the other two 








Graph 2: Support for a Coup d’état due to High Crime 
 
 
 All citizenries are far more likely to support a coup d’état due to high crime than they are 
to support a coup d’état due to high unemployment. The extent of the differences are quite 
startling, both with respect to just how much more supportive each citizenry is to support a coup 
due to crime than unemployment and in how much more supportive Argentina and Uruguay are 
than is Chile. With this being said, only minorities of each population are supportive of such 
measures. Nonetheless, elites prioritizing democratic continuity should take the differences into 
account when constructing policy: high crime is more likely to drive citizens to support 
democratic alternatives than is high unemployment. Chileans are statistically significantly less 
likely to support a coup due to high crime than are Argentines and Uruguayans. In this regard, 
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Chileans have more leeway: presumably, it would require a higher degree of crime in Chile than 
in Argentina or Uruguay for Chileans to abandon their democratic commitment.   
 A possible explanation for why Uruguayan support for a coup due to high crime is 
statistically significantly greater than in Chile is that Uruguayans are far more likely to say crime 
or violence is the most important problem facing the country. 56% of Uruguayans supported this 
sentiment, only trailing Venezuela (66%) and Trinidad & Tobago (59.7%), far outpacing 
Chileans who expressed this sentiment 37.5% of the time (Argentines are at 43.7%) (Seligson et 
al. 2012: 130). Argentines and Uruguayans also report much higher percentages of having a 
crime victim in their houses, 34.7% and 34.2% respectively, than Chileans (21.6%), a reality that 
is further on display when considering percentages of the population that report a crime victim in 
their households in the national capitals: Montevideo (46.5%), Buenos Aires (43.8%), and 
Santiago (23.5%) (Seligson et al. 2012: 144-5). Insofar as a public perceives crime and violence 
to be a great threat, this very well could increase the likelihood to support a coup to address the 
issue, even in a country like Uruguay which does not boast many indicators that would suggest it 
is fertile grounds for support for coups. 
H3: There will be a statistically significant difference between each of the three cases with 
regard to support for a coup due to high corruption. Support will be lowest in Chile, 
because they trust their institutions, as detailed in H2, and corruption in the country is low. 
Support will fall in between Chile and Argentina for Uruguay, as trust in institutions is 
middling but corruption is low. Support will be highest in Argentina, as trust in institutions 





Graph 3: Support for a Coup d’état due to High Corruption 
 
 
 Support for a coup d’état due to high corruption is akin to support for a coup d’état due to 
high crime. Each country is slightly less likely to support a coup due to corruption than a coup 
due to crime, but also much more likely support a coup due to corruption than a coup due to high 
unemployment. Elites who focus on democratic continuity should thus prioritize rooting out 
crime and corruption—presumably initiatives that go hand in hand with one another. Once again, 
Chileans are statistically significantly less likely to support a coup due to high corruption than 
are Argentines and Uruguayans.   
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 Interestingly, just 3.2% of Uruguayans perceive corruption to be the most important 
problem facing the country; El Salvador (2.7%) is the only country in the region registering a 
lower percentage (Seligson et al. 2012: 131). Yet, Uruguayan support for a coup due to 
corruption is on par with support for a coup due to crime, a problem Uruguayans do consider to 
be quite pressing. 
 Argentines are far more likely to report being a victim of corruption (19.2%), than are 
Uruguayans (8.2%) or Chileans (5.8%). As it follows, they also perceive corruption at a higher 
percentage (79.5%) than Uruguayans (61.8%) and Chileans (64.9%) (Seligson et al. 2012: 153, 
156). This could help explain why Argentines are most supportive of a coup due to high 
corruption, but is not particularly helpful in explaining why Uruguayans are right behind despite 
recording a far lower perception of corruption percentage. And as for Chileans, institutional 
reforms targeted reducing corruption and succeeded in doing so: as before, Chileans are content 
with the integrity of their institutions.  
 On shutting down Congress, it is simply likely to be considered a very drastic measure. 
Such an action would be abnormal for these countries, and its citizens are aware of the negative 
impact this course of action has had on other countries who have adopted this approach more 
recently. Removing such a check on the executive would seemingly open the door for corruption 
as well, so any citizens concerned with the problem of corruption would find no reason to 
support this course of action.  
H4: There will be no statistically significant difference between the countries regarding 




Graph 4: Support for Shutting Down Congress in Difficult Times 
  
A substantial minority in each country is supportive of the executive shutting down 
Congress in difficult times. A possible caveat is that “difficult times” is quite vague, and a more 
specific scenario which evokes sympathy towards the executive could drive up support for such a 
measure. Nonetheless, the low percentages here are encouraging. Chileans, as they are for 
support for a coup due to high crime and high corruption, are statistically significantly less 
supportive of the executive shutting down Congress than are Argentines and Uruguayans. 
Institutional reform for each of the cases has emphasized the importance of the separation 
of powers and checks and balances. For the citizenry to support shutting down Congress in 
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certain instances would amount to a wholesale rejection of the democratic principles institutional 
reform has, at least partially, sought to engender. Chileans register statistically significantly less 
support for shutting down Congress, in all likelihood, due to superior institutional reform and 
lesser crime and corruption. There are no reasons why shutting down Congress would be 
sensible to them. 
Category II: Support for Institutions Involved in Authoritarian Rule 
 
H5: Chileans will have the most trust in their police force due to reforms following 
transition increasing police professionalism. Argentina will have the least trust in its police 
due to its close association with military dictatorship, and its unwillingness to tackle 
impunity. Uruguay will land in between Chile and Argentina—having undergone some 
















Graph 5: Distrust in the Police 
 
 
Trust in police is less encouraging than are support for authoritarian measures such as 
coups or executive unilateralism. Trust in police in Chile is high, a testament to the 
professionalism and oversight of the Chilean Carabineros. While recent instances of brutality 
and corruption have occurred and ought to be eradicated, overall perception of the Chilean police 
is quite positive. Uruguay’s trust in police is moderate: about half of Uruguayans trust the police, 
and slightly less than a third believe they engage in corrupt practices. No longer engaging in any 
form of torture, and improving prison conditions, would go a long way in improving Uruguay’s 
trust in police scores—which as they stand represent a high floor with room for improvement. 
Argentina’s trust in police is relatively low, which is concerning. Impunity remains high, reforms 
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have proven largely ineffective, and, while they do not target the middle class as they did under 
the dictatorship, they now disproportionately target the poor who are demonized by the media. 
The numbers suggest Argentina needs to take steps to improve its policing practices and 
represent all sectors of society. Should they continue down the current path, they run the risk of 
alienating the poor to the point that they seek alternatives to democratic rule if this is the style of 
policing that democracy yields.   
Argentine distrust in police is particularly discouraging, as it eclipses the median 
threshold on the 0-100 scale. Regardless of the degree to which the Argentine public is stubborn 
in forgiving the police for their role in the Dirty War, police need to do more to earn back the 
public trust as the military has effectively begun to do so. Discontinuing a disproportionate 
targeting of the poor would be an effective start, and the media should be more responsible in its 
framing of crime which disproportionately blames the poor. Such reforms run the risk of 
alienating the middle class who are the perceived benefactors of the policies and framing, but 
one would hope that, in reformation, the middle class would appreciate a police force striving for 
fairness—outweighing the benefits of not being disproportionately targeted like the poor. Ideally, 
the middle class would remain not targeted unfairly anyway, and thus experience no net change 
in their interactions with the police.  
Notably, the hypothetical positive response by the middle class detailed above is, in all 
likelihood, wishful thinking: the middle class does not enjoy when the poor is treated the same or 
make gains that place them on a level playing field. Even if the game is not necessarily zero-
sum, reforms would anger the middle class. But ultimately, even though the middle class might 
resent that the poor begin to receive similar police treatment to what they experience, fair and 
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honest policing would in all likelihood drive up overall trust in police. At the least, fair policing 
helps contribute to a society that is more trusting of each other.  
 Uruguay’s trust in police, although not as low as Argentina’s, is not particularly 
reassuring either. Uruguay’s police face similar issues: they are associated with the crimes of 
yesteryear, but they also disproportionately target the poor and minorities and engage in rampant 
pretrial detention. Discontinuing these practices would go a long way towards improving the 
public trust in the police as an institution. Chileans are statistically significantly more trusting of 
their police than are Argentines and Uruguayans, and Uruguayans are statistically significantly 
more trusting of their police than are Argentines. On this count, a clear hierarchy between the 
countries exists. 
 
H6: In accord with H5, Chileans will be the least likely to believe police are involved in 
crime, while Argentines will be the most likely to believe police are involved in crime. 


























 The perception that police are involved in crime tells a very similar story to distrust in 
police. Naturally, if a citizenry does not trust its police force, it would follow that a key reason as 
to why is because they believe the institution is corrupt. The same relationships between the 
countries are existent as were with regard to police trust, and the only noteworthy discrepancy 
between the two variables is that Chileans are approximately 6% less likely to believe the police 
is corrupt than they are to distrust the police. Granted that it is still a clear minority of Chileans 
that are either distrustful of the police or believe that the police are corrupt, the logical deduction 
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here is that there are Chileans who are distrustful of the police for reasons outside of the belief 
that they are corrupt.  
 
H7: Chileans will be the most trusting of their military, and Argentines will be the least 
trusting of their military. While the Argentine military has made strides, it has had to dig 
out of much greater depths, in terms of public opinion, than has the Chilean military. Trust 
in the Uruguayan military will fall in between Chile and Argentina. 
 






 Public distrust in the military in both Chile and Uruguay is comparable to their respective 
public distrust in the police. Citizens either do not make a clear distinction between the military 
and the police when they consider their trust in them, indeed they may put them both in the same 
“security basket,” or the police and military in each country have been similarly effective in 
cultivating their image. Uruguayans are statistically significantly less likely to trust their military 
than Chileans, so there are clear steps the Chilean military has taken, or perhaps a level of 
prosecution and atonement undergone by the Chilean military, that the Uruguayan military has 
eluded. While the Uruguayan police’s perpetuation of excessive pretrial detention and poor 
prison conditions could help explain the discrepancy between Chilean and Uruguayan trust in 
police, my research has not yielded any findings that would suggest that the Uruguayan military 
is less likely than the Chilean military to engage in human rights abuses. In fact, as Graph 8 will 
show, there is no statistically significant difference between Chilean and Uruguayan perception 
that their respective militaries engage in human rights abuses. Therefore, barring an unaccounted 
for factor, it is highly likely that Chileans are more trusting of their military than are Uruguayans 
because the Chilean military did not entirely escape justice. In Uruguay, the military has skirted 
prosecution and atonement, and quite naturally the public is less trusting of the institution. 
Argentine trust in its military is higher than in its police, and in recent years has been on 
the rise. The military’s ability to make strides in rebranding its image is a testament to its staying 
out of influencing democratic politics. While crime remains high and the police continue to 
alienate members of society, the military has mostly stayed in its lane, and as a result the public 
has softened on them. This is an encouraging sign as it reveals that institutions can rebrand their 
negative image if both they and the public take steps to integrate them into the new democratic 
order. There is always the possibility looming that an overly-positive assessment of the military 
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could pave the way for a future coup with substantial public backing, but generally speaking it is 
better for the public to trust its military than the alternative. Argentina’s middling, but rising, 
numbers are positive, and the police could learn from some of the actions taken by the military to 
improve its image. 
 Argentina’s military is the least trusted of the lot, but unlike with respect to the police, 
there is no statistically significant difference between public distrust of the military in Argentina 
and Uruguay. The Argentine public is far more favorable of its military than its police—a 
testament to the military’s reforms which are discussed at more length in other sections. The 
discrepancy between Chilean and Argentine trust in its military is in all likelihood due to the fact 
that the Argentine military was disproportionately blamed for the Dirty War in a way the Chilean 
military was not, a phenomenon also discussed extensively elsewhere. Nevertheless, trust in the 
Argentine military has continued to increase in recent years, and it is possible that in the near 
future trust in the Argentine military will overtake Uruguay and perhaps even challenge Chile. 
Pivotally, even though this variable shows Argentina with the greatest distrust in its military, the 
combination of positive trends, tangible reforms, and the fact that it began its “rebranding” from 
such a discredited position make this finding an encouraging one for the prospects of Argentine 
democracy. 
H8: Following from H7, Chileans will be the most likely to believe the military respects their 
human rights. Argentina will be the least likely to believe the military respects their human 






Graph 8: Military Doesn’t Respect Human Rights 
 
 
As aforementioned, Chilean and Uruguayan perception that the military respects human 
rights is nearly identical, and this must mean that there are alternative reasons as to why the 
Chilean public trusts the military more so than the Uruguayan public. I posit this is because the 
Uruguayan military was never held accountable for its role in human rights abuses under the 
dictatorship. Also worth noting, these numbers amount to considerable percentages who believe 
their militaries engage in human rights abuses: even in Chile, where the military is more trusted 
than in Uruguay, the public still might very well associate the military with its legacy of human 
rights abuses. Unless proven otherwise, publics could tacitly assume the military still engages in 
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abuses for which they are historically notorious. And in Uruguay, since the military has been 
reluctant to admit guilt for abuse, nor held accountable, this could also help explain its higher 
support than in Chile. 
Argentines are statistically significantly more likely to believe their military engages in 
human rights abuses than are Chileans and Uruguayans, but this sentiment is trending 
downwards. The survey data shows that the military still has a great deal of work to do yet to 
secure a clearly positive image, but the Argentine military is taking positive steps, and the public 
is taking notice. 
Category III: Quality of Democratic Government 
H9: There will be no statistically significant difference between these countries with respect 
to trust in free and fair elections. I would expect that citizens of all these countries, by and 
large, trust their electoral processes. Transition to democracy in these cases led to similar 
electoral structures, and each country has observed the peaceful transition of executive 













Graph 9: Low Trust in Free and Fair Elections 
 
 
 Uruguayans are statistically significantly more likely to trust their elections are free and 
fair than are Chileans and Argentines, and Chileans are statistically significantly more likely to 
trust their elections than Argentines. Uruguay’s results are highly positive: people trust the 
elections, and political elites have done nothing to reduce such trust. Power has been peacefully 
passed between parties, and, as discussed in more depth in Chapter 3, the Uruguayan dictatorship 
actually maintained several aspects of the democratic framework.  
 Although constituting a clear minority of the populace, Chileans are more likely to 
believe elections are not free and fair in comparison to Uruguayans. Argentines are marginally 
more distrustful than Chileans, but quite clearly Argentine and Chilean distrust is more akin to 
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one another—both countries are far less trusting in their electoral process than Uruguayans. This 
finding is perplexing: both countries have also passed power between both parties peacefully, 
and electoral fraud is not a prominent theme in the literature examined during this study. One 
possibility is that Argentine and Chilean citizens feel as though they are only ever able to vote 
for corrupt politicians, and therefore their interests are never actually represented because 
politics is rotted with corrupt officials. From this vantage point, elections are not fixed or unfair, 
per se, but they are limited in effecting change and futile at worst. 
 
H10: There will be no statistically significant difference between these countries regarding 
belief in respect for human rights. I would expect that citizens of all these countries, by and 
























 All three countries report a very similar belief in the idea that human rights are respected. 
Chileans are statistically significantly more likely to believe human rights are respected than are 
Argentines, but just barely. Across the board, these numbers are middling, but, given the 
capabilities of these countries, there is room for improvement for each of them. 
Category IV: Support for Abuse of Power / Authoritarian Measures 
 In predicting support for police torture, a key dynamic to consider is that, although 
Chileans have the greatest trust in their police, I do not see this support translating to condoning 
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torture in large number. Argentines trust their police the least, and therefore would not grant 
them a “blank check” to practice torture. Uruguayans have middling trust in their police and live 
in a society which still practices torture; while a majority of Uruguayans would not support 
torture, it is my belief that the practice is desirable to a sizable minority and, given middling 
police trust, support for police torture will be on par with their Southern Cone counterparts. 
H11: I do not expect for there to be a statistically significant difference between the 
countries regarding support for police torture.  





All three countries report similar support for the use of torture by police. Albeit by a very 
slim margin, Uruguay leads the pack here in supporting torture. Given Uruguay’s unwillingness 
to completely abandon torture post-transition, this lends credence to the idea that, for a minority 
but still considerable number of Uruguayans, torture has been accepted and normalized. The 
clear remedy is for Uruguay to completely abolish torture: as a society, Uruguay possesses all the 
prerequisites for having extremely low support of torture. The state’s reluctance to capitalize on 
these conditions is bewildering, and frankly constitutes as state negligence.  
In consideration of support for iron-fist government, worthy of appreciation is that 
conservative Chileans who still identify with Pinochet likely constitute a sizable minority support 
base for iron-fist rule. Argentina, too, has social classes which perceive iron-fist rule to be to 
their benefit—cracking down on poorer classes. Uruguay does not have as much socioeconomic 
divide as other cases, but, given that crime is such a concern in Uruguay, I believe this will drive 
up support for iron-fist rule to be on par with Chile and Argentina—even if a lack of 
socioeconomic divide would suggest Uruguay would trail the other two cases. 
 
H12: I do not expect for there to be statistically significant differences between the countries 















 Support for Iron-fist government is highest in Chile and lowest in Uruguay, and each 
country is statistically significantly different from one another. Chile’s relatively high number 
reveals a potential drawback of relatively high trust in the police and military: a population is 
more willing to grant these institutions discretion, and this can lead to a greater chance of 
institutional abuse. Ideally, Chileans would desire to protect its trust in these institutions, 
sensibly regulating them and acknowledging that they are relatively highly trusted because they 
are unable or unwilling to act with an iron-fist, but a substantial minority of Chileans are not in 
lockstep with this line of thinking.  
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Classes that have wealth sometimes express a desire to protect it at any and all costs, and 
an iron-fist approach to crime is a necessary, calculated sacrifice—and one that will not 
negatively affect them. Quite possibly, a lesser socioeconomic divide may contribute to less 
support for an iron-fist government in Uruguay: there are less wealthy calculating the need to 
protect their gains from the poor “Other”. What is more clearly substantiated by other findings is 
that Uruguayans are unlikely to support an iron-fist government because they are less trusting of 
their police and military than Chileans, and one of their greatest gripes is that the government 
once ruled with an iron-fist and was never held to account. Argentines are in the middle of the 
pack here: they are less trusting of their institutions than their Southern Cone counterparts, but 
their wealthy and middle classes also want to protect their gains. 
 
H13: I do not anticipate there will be statistically significant differences regarding support 






















 None of the three states have high support for a non-elected leader. Interestingly though, 
Chileans are statistically significantly more supportive of a non-elected leader than are 
Uruguayans. Nostalgia for Pinochet lives on, apparently, and there may be the occasional leftist 
respondent who wishes an alternative to Pinera could emerge undemocratically. Altogether 
though, these countries are not supportive of an unelected leader. 
 When considering support for alternatives to democracy, I believe inequality plays a key 
causal role. In spite of perceiving crime to be an important issue, I believe Uruguay’s relative 
lack of inequality will make it the strongest adherents to democracy. Argentina boasts worse 
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economic measures, but its citizens do not highly trust the institutions that stand to gain from 
democratic reversal. Chileans, alternatively, do boast relatively strong economic indicators, but 
retain a conservative, authoritarian enclave that is ever open to democratic alternatives. 
H14: I expect Uruguayans to support democracy the most; I would then expect Argentines 
and Chileans to report similarly. 
 




 Even though each country is highly unsupportive of a non-elected leader, there is far 
more widespread belief that democracy is not the best form of government. Uruguayans are the 
most committed democrats, and Argentines trail closely behind. It is Chileans who are 
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statistically significantly far more likely to say that democracy is not the best form of 
government relative to Argentines and Uruguayans. These findings are corroborated in LAPOP’s 
2012 Regional Report (Seligson et al. 2012: 214). 
The discrepancy between Chilean support for a non-elected leader and support for the 
idea that democracy is not the best form of government is quite fascinating. Initially paradoxical, 
the discrepancy may well be attributable to the fact that a non-elected leader immediately evokes 
the image of Pinochet, a figure increasingly discredited in the 21
st
 century, while entertaining 
that democracy may not be the best form of government does not immediately make one feel as 
though they are supportive of Pinochet or necessarily dictatorship for that matter. And while a 
non-elected leader might immediately compel a leftist to think of Pinochet, the prospect of 
alternatives to democracy does not do the same. Lest a false equivalency be created, too, even 
though this question may invite leftists more than the previous one, it is those on the Chilean 
right that are far, far more likely to express support for authoritarianism. As such, the Chilean 
number is composed of many, many more on the right than the left. Nonetheless, altogether, this 
finding goes to show that there are pockets of support for soft authoritarianism in Chile that 
simply are not nearly as prevalent in Argentina or Uruguay. And as speculated in the 
Introduction, it is possible that this “authoritarian enclave” in Chile does not consist of the exact 
same socioeconomic group as Pinochet’s: this new enclave may well consist of many poorer 
citizens who identify with more authoritarian approaches to crime. 
 An additional explanation for why Uruguayans emerge as the most committed democrats 
of the cases is that they register a higher level of civic engagement. 9% of Uruguayans report 
having attended a local government meeting, a percentage that is actually comparatively low in 
Latin America, but more than doubles Argentina (4.3%) and Chile (4.1%) who report the lowest 
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levels in the entire region (Seligson et al. 2012: 170). Additional research could investigate why 
civic participation in Argentina and Chile is so low; indeed, this is a phenomenon that appears to 
be known and accepted, but an explanation for why other citizenries with similar historical pasts 
engage politically in a way Argentines and Chileans do not does not obviously lend itself. 
 As has been noted, Chileans trust the institutions that were empowered by the 
dictatorship more than Argentines. While this contributes to a reluctance for Argentines to 
entertain alternatives to democracy (and instead alternatives for Argentines are supported on 
economic grounds), for Chileans an authoritarian enclave persists, and institutions associated 
with dictatorship are respected. I have considered that the enclave may no longer consist of the 
same socioeconomic makeup as it did under Pinochet, and that many poor have joined as 
wealthy “new democrats” have undergone a mass exodus, but it is also quite possible that the 
nature of the transition itself contributes to the persistence of the enclave. Institutions associated 
with the dictatorship were not vilified, and Pinochet and fellow political allies enjoyed seats in 
Congress and on the courts in the 1990s and early 2000s. Another explanation for why the 
enclave persists could then be that, like a fire, it was given oxygen for more than a decade after 
transition. The base’s interests were normalized in the young democracy, its elites held on to 
significant power. Thus, democracy never signaled to the enclave that its expiration date had 
come because Chile was now a democracy. 
 
H15: Along the same lines as my justifications for H14, I would expect Uruguayans to report 
the least openness to democratic alternatives, followed by Argentines and Chileans who will 





Graph 15: Openness to Alternatives to Democracy 
 
 
 Similar to the previous finding, a considerable minority of Chileans are statistically 
significantly much more likely to be open to alternatives to democracy than are Argentines or 
Uruguayans. Uruguayans, again, show to be the most committed democrats, and Argentines are 
right behind. Chileans are a distant third. It is ironic because Chileans have solid metrics across 
the board for all other predictors of why a population might seek an alternative to democracy, 
and yet they are still the most open to an alternative. Those who were “winners” under Pinochet 
still must remember his tenure fondly, but perhaps there is more to it than that. After all, Chilean 
wealthy, indeed the winners under Pinochet, now are the strongest backers of democracy.  
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Chile’s findings invite the possibility that, when democratic measures are ticking along 
quite well, populations are susceptible to the idea that conditions would be fine without it. In 
essence, it is not democracy which is driving success, and the same initiatives which have been 
adopted under democracy could just as easily be adopted under authoritarian rule. The allure of 
authoritarian directness, particularly one that would align with one’s own policy prescriptions, 
appears to linger in a sizable minority of the Chilean collective. This predicament is also worthy 























CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION OF GENERATIONAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC DIVIDES 
 
 Now that Chapter 4 has provided a cross-national comparison of the cases, in Chapter 5 I 
will consider how different groups within regionally salient social cleavages behave in regards to 
their democratic attitudes. Knowledge of which demographics may be more and less supportive 
of democratic values can help in creating targeted messages to rein in groups that are susceptible 
to authoritarian dispositions. I will first begin with a breakdown by socioeconomic status, then 
by age, and lastly by gender. For socioeconomic status and age, I use Pearson correlation 
coefficients to measure whether there is a statistically significant linear correlation between my 
chosen categories (x) and democratic attitudes (y). For gender, considering there are minimal 
statistically significant differences, only questions which featured statistically significant 
differences within at least one of the cases will be considered and discussed. 
Socioeconomic Status  
 For regional socioeconomic status, I have separated the classes into three groups: New 
Poor, Structural Poor, and Wealthy. The structural poor and wealthy are, indeed, the classes that 
earn the least and most amount of income, respectively, and own household items that are 
commensurate to the income they earn and the lifestyle their incomes can afford. LAPOP divides 
income into 16 different earning brackets and, for my purposes, brackets 0-6 constituted incomes 
of the poor and brackets 7-16 constituted incomes of the wealthy.  
The “New Poor,” alternatively, are people who were once middle class, but now earn 
incomes that would be classified as poor. The new poor are distinguishable because they own 
household items that are above what their income would allow them to afford; in other words, 
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their household items were obtained when they earned a middle income living (or at least 
someone in the family did). Often times, new poor, consisting of low income earners, move in 
together with other family members to create larger households (numerically), and the 
disproportionate number of household items are a relic from more prosperous times when they 
could be afforded without pooling so many resources together and/or moving in to more crowded 
households.  
I distinguish the new poor because they are a class in of themselves, but it is also 
important to see how they view themselves and the institutions of society that have ultimately 
created the situation they now find themselves. Do they act as class allies of the structural poor—
now that they earn the same as them? This would create a situation whereby the new poor would 
advocate for similar redistributive economic policies as the structural poor, if not consciously 
then at least subconsciously acknowledging that neoliberal policies are responsible for the lot of 
themselves as well as the structural poor. Or, do the new poor behave more like the wealthy? Are 
they more prone to resent and blame the structural poor as to whom they now earn the same, and 
in essence hold a class view that perceives themselves as temporarily embarrassed millionaires? 
The latter supposition, that new poor harbor particular disdain for the structural poor, is 
supported by the fact that many Argentine new poor are known to have shown disgust with 
Kirchner era policies that targeted reducing income inequality. The new poor felt as though the 
structural poor were receiving “free stuff” at their expense, and that this was bringing them down 
to the levels of the structural poor to no fault of their own (Roich 2017). This does go to show 
that the middle class is typically more easily able to cast its scorn downward when their relative 
position in society is deteriorating than to align with lower classes and see the common causal 
enemy that which is above. 
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The questions used in my study do not directly address support for various economic 
policies, but what can be observed from the data is whether the new poor is in lockstep with 
either the structural poor or the wealthy on democratic attitudes and support for the rule of law, 
or if they adopt a line of thinking that is distinctly their own. Moreover, should they adopt 
positions that are consistent with either the structural poor or the wealthy, then I can cautiously 
predict how this would relate to economic perspectives and who they ultimately see (or at least 
vote with) as class allies and enemies.      
Table for Category 1:  Pearson Correlations 
 
































     
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
 For authoritarian measures, the structural poor are more willing to support coups due to 
high unemployment, crime, and corruption than are the wealthy. Supporting a coup due to high 
unemployment is consistent with a class-centered economic outlook insofar as if a democratic 
government is not delivering employment opportunities for the poor then entertaining the 
possibility that a different government via coup could do is a coherent perspective. Economic 
considerations are less helpful in explaining higher structural poor support for coups due to crime 
or corruption, however, they are in line with expectations that structural poor are more receptive 
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to authoritarian measures. The new poor do not behave like the structural poor nor the wealthy 
on these counts.  
Table for Category 2: Pearson Correlations 
 
 Police Trust Police Integrity Military Trust Military Respect 
for Human 
Rights 
























     
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
  
The new poor are more likely to believe the police are engaged in crime and corruption 
than either the structural poor or the wealthy. This is quite an interesting finding: the new poor, 
to some degree, may blame the police for their decline in society. Perhaps, now earning poor 
income levels, they are now being policed in a way that they were not used to being policed 
when middle class, and this drives up belief in the notion that the police are involved in crime. 
Such a hypothesis, however, is not helpful in explaining why there are no statistically significant 
differences in police trust. 
 Sentiments pertaining to the military reveal fascinating findings as well. The structural 
poor are more trusting of the military than the wealthy, and it is the new poor that are more likely 
to believe the military engages in human rights abuses than either the structural poor or the 
wealthy. These findings suggest the military is doing best with gaining the approval of the poor 
and should explore ways to appeal to the wealthy who are the least trusting of it. Regarding 
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respect for human rights, the new poor are least likely to believe the military respects them. In 
Argentina, this could in part be due to the lasting memory of the military targeting the middle 
class: presumably, of which, many new poor would have identified with at the time. This line of 
thinking is less helpful in the Chilean and Uruguayan cases where it was mostly the poor who 
were targeted. Either way, the military should find ways to appeal to the new poor in their 
countries; they are not adopting the same positive perceptions of the military as the poor and, on 
perceptions of human rights abuses, they are the military’s staunchest critics. 
Table for Category 3: Pearson Correlations 
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 Regarding the quality of democratic government, the wealthy are more likely to believe 
elections are free and fair than are the structural poor. The new poor, although not statistically 
significantly so, adopt a framework that is more in line with the structural poor than the wealthy. 
This gives further credence to the idea that the poor do not view the options and candidates for 
which they are voting to be truly addressing their needs: they very well may view most 
politicians as corrupt and hardly looking out for their interests. Politicians should take note: if 
perceived as only representing the interests of a particular social class and/or engaging in 
corruption, this ultimately undermines trust in democracy. 
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Table for Category 4: Pearson Correlations 
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 On abuse of power and authoritarian measures, the structural poor are more likely to 
support an iron-fist government, a non-elected leader, and alternatives to democracy than are the 
wealthy. These findings are all consistent with the thesis that the structural poor are more 
receptive to authoritarian measures, as the findings regarding support for coups corroborated 
earlier. The new poor generally fall right in between the structural poor and the wealthy on these 
measures: neither as supportive of authoritarian measures as the structural poor nor as committed 
to democracy as the wealthy.  
For policymakers, making strides in addressing the needs of the structural and the new 
poor would seem to increase democratic commitment. In theory, such initiatives would win 
support of the structural poor and decrease erosion of support of the new poor. Clearly, it is a 
delicate balance: a true commitment to the poor unfortunately alienates the wealthy, a class that 
is quite committed to democracy now but knows its economic supremacy has historically not 
been challenged by military dictatorships in the region. And a commitment to the poor can even 
alienate the new poor, as evidenced by Kirchner era reforms perceived to only be benefiting the 
structural poor displeasing them. Overall, representing the interests of the country broadly 
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proportionate to the socioeconomic profile of the region seems viable: genuine interest 
representation can only increase democratic support.  
Moving away from neoliberal approaches, particularly in Argentina and Chile, could 
bother the wealthy, but any loss in democratic support from the wealthy could and should be 
offset by gains in support from the poor who would feel as though they were heard. The reality, 
right now, is they are more at-risk to abandon democratic commitment than are the wealthy. One 
could certainly retort that it is only when the wealthy abandon democratic commitment, in this 
region, that democracy could fall (in other words, the poor have no agency to undermine 
democracy), but it is the values of democracy that are at stake as well. Democracy at large may 
not be at-risk in the region, then, but the type and values of democracy certainly are: democracy 
can condone or prohibit policies such as police or military abuse. Finding ways to drive down 
support for these policies, lest more officials successfully campaign on the backs of them, a la a 
Bolsonaro in Brazil, are pivotal. 
Age    
Moving on to generational cleavages, I have separated these into three categories: those 
who have experience living under the dictatorship, those who had experience living under the 
democratic transition (but not the dictatorship), and those who are schoolage (having not lived 
under dictatorship or transition). Naturally, the intent here is to see whether experiencing times 







Table for Category 1:  Pearson Correlations 
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 On the count of support for a coup due to unemployment, those who lived under 
dictatorship are significantly less supportive of them than schoolage citizens. On support for a 
coup due to crime, those who lived under dictatorship are significantly less supportive of them 
than those who only lived under transition. And on support for a coup due to corruption, those 
who lived under dictatorship are significantly less supportive than those who only lived under 
transition and schoolage citizens. As is quite apparent, those who lived under dictatorship 
express less authoritarian attitudes than those who only lived under transition or schoolage 
citizens: they have experience with the trauma associated with coups and military rule, and are 
less willing to support measures that would invite the risk of repeating them. Given those who 
did not live under dictatorship are more willing to entertain coups, initiatives that educate the 







Table for Category 2: Pearson Correlations 
 































     
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
 Those who lived under dictatorship are more trusting of the police and the military than 
those who only lived under transition and the schoolage citizens. It can be deduced that, across 
the region, those who lived under the dictatorship have shown willingness to forgive these 
institutions for the crimes of the dictatorship. Alternatively, they may have lower expectations of 
these institutions, resulting in a relatively more positive assessment than the younger generations. 
 It is equally plausible that the younger generations are less trusting of these institutions 
because they are more likely to have negative interactions with them—perhaps because they are 
more likely to be poor than members of the older generation. Also possible is that they hold these 
institutions responsible for the crimes of the dictatorships in a way that the older generation who 
actually lived through them does not: this would create an interesting dynamic wherein those 
who have only heard stories of the dictatorship are more resentful of complicit institutions than 
the people who lived through it. However, considering younger generations are more likely to 
entertain coups than the older generation, it would seem the more likely theory is that they are 
more likely to have negative interactions with these institutions in the present 
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Table for Category 3: Pearson Correlations 
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 Those who lived under the dictatorship are more likely than those who lived under 
transition and those who are schoolage to believe elections are free and fair, and they are more 
likely than those who lived under only transition to believe their human rights are respected. 
Similar to possibilities previously considered, it could be the case that those who lived under 
dictatorship are more appreciative of elections under democracy, having had experience with 
times in which elections were not a staple of society. Alternatively, those who lived under the 
dictatorship could feel as though their interests are more represented by elected officials than 
those who lived only under transition or schoolage citizens, though this would presuppose that 
these categorical cohorts act as coherent voting blocs expressing broadly uniform interests. As 
such, the former theory seems to be the most plausible. 
 On human rights, again, expectations may be lowered: those who lived under dictatorship 
know just how restricted human rights can be. Alternatively, it could be the case that their human 
rights simply are not as disrespected as younger Southern Cone citizens who may be more prone 
to have negative interactions featuring human rights abuse. Those who only lived under 
transition, interestingly, are most likely to believe their human rights are abused: perhaps coming 
of age during the promise of transition has increased their demands for justice and greater human 
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rights protections. Insofar as they perceive the state to not be delivering on these grandiose 
promises, they will render a negative assessment of commitment to human rights. 
Table for Category 4: Pearson Correlations 
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 Those who lived under dictatorship are less supportive of police torture and more 
supportive of the idea that democracy is the best form of government than schoolage citizens. 
This is consistent with the position that younger citizens are more likely than those who lived 
under dictatorship to hold nondemocratic attitudes. With this being said, one counterintuitive 
finding is that those who lived under dictatorship are more likely to support an iron-fist 
government than are those who lived under transition and schoolage citizens. Perhaps, greater 
trust in democracy and its institutions is leading those who lived under the dictatorship to feel as 
though they can grant them more discretion while younger cohorts, more skeptical of the 
integrity of these institutions, are less willing to do so. 
 It is also worth considering that with regard to the question regarding support for iron-fist 
government, it may simply not be a good survey question. What I mean by this is that it is not 
yielding good results or eliciting responses from respondents that are in align with everything 
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else they are saying. The term “iron-fist” may be being interpreted too broadly, perhaps to extend 
to perceptions of economic approaches which it is not intended to necessarily gauge, or it could 
simply mean different things to different people. As a result, surveyors should consider whether 
the question pertaining to iron-fist rule should be amended or dropped from future 
questionnaires.  
Gender 
Graph 1: Support for a Coup due to High Crime 
 
 
 Chilean women are statistically significantly more likely to support a coup due to high 
crime than are men. This is consistent with scholarship which discusses the general conservative 
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disposition of Chilean women. Allende found it difficult to garner the support of Chilean women, 
particularly of the churchgoing upper-middle class variety, and it is women who took to the 
streets to usher in the Pinochet era with great enthusiasm. 
 
 










Graph 3: Support for Police Torture 
 
 
 Argentine and Uruguayan men are statistically significantly more likely to support police 
torture than Argentine and Uruguayan women. On this count, men in these countries have a more 
authoritarian disposition. Chilean men also registered higher support for police torture than 
women, but not statistically significantly so. That only in Chile did men and women not 
statistically significantly differ likely shows that the authoritarian-democratic gap is less 
pronounced by gender in Chile than it is in the other cases. And in all likelihood, it is because 





CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 Throughout this analysis, I have argued that public support for democracy and the rule of 
law is the byproduct of the process of institutional reform mediated by social cleavages, such as 
socioeconomic and generational divides. My three cases validate this argument.  
 In Uruguay, citizens deem crime to be an important problem, and crime rates in the likes 
of Montevideo suggest this sentiment is justified. Resultantly, Uruguayans are more likely to 
support a coup due to crime than are Chileans. Its modest institutional reform at the time of 
transition, which granted a great deal of discretion to the executive and the courts to determine 
whether human rights violators would be prosecuted, ensured limited prosecution would take 
place. For post-transition executives and courts were anti-prosecution. The public has been given 
an opportunity to repeal amnesty laws on two occasions via referendum, but in both instances 
voted against doing so. Indeed, the stymieing of holding human rights abusers accountable has 
been a collective effort in Uruguay. 
 This prevention of holding abusers to account, I argue, contributes to middling trust in 
police and military. Having never fully atoned for their actions under dictatorship, Uruguayans 
are more distrustful of their military and police than Chileans. The irony is that, if the public 
would have voted in favor of either previous referendum, this would have provided the 
opportunity to begin to mend relations. In this regard, the 2013 repeal of the amnesty law by the 
Uruguayan parliament has provided an opportunity that the public simply refused to provide.  
 Poor prison conditions and rampant pretrial detention do no favors to improving trust in 
police either, particularly with regard to poor Uruguayans who are the disproportionate victims 
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of these practices. Professionalizing the police as an institution, like has occurred in Chile, would 
open the door for better poor-police relations in Uruguay. Similarly, discontinuing the practice of 
torture altogether would improve relations, and I argue there is little stopping Uruguayan elites 
from discontinuing such practices.  
 Chileans register high trust in their institutions, and successful reform of the police at the 
time of transition can be credited with contributing to high trust in the police. The military was 
not humiliated like in Argentina either, so, while the argument can certainly be entertained that 
Pinochet and his allies retained too much power post-transition, this did contribute to trust in the 
military never dipping too, too low. Encouragingly, just because Chileans trust their police does 
not compel them to condone police torture: in fact, the polling indicates they very much trust the 
police because they refrain from acting with impunity.  
 And yet, Chileans are the most likely to consider alternatives to democracy. This gives 
credence to the idea that the soft authoritarian pocket in Chile was normalized at the time of 
transition when so much power was still given to the Pinochet-wing in the new democracy. 
Could more have been done to ensure this pocket would not be normalized at the time of 
transition? I argue this would have been very difficult considering Pinochet and the military held 
the cards in determining the rules of the game. With that being said, there would appear to be 
ways to chip away at this pocket in the present: my research suggests it is prioritizing economic 
policies that aid the poor who are more prone to find the pocket appealing. 
 Finally, in Argentina, it is clear that food insecurity and high crime rates, particularly in 
urban areas, contribute to a desire to consider coups more than in Chile. Quite naturally, 
addressing these problems is key to driving down these support numbers. But it is the police that 
is the most urgent concern. When an institution is often perceived to be acting with impunity, 
107 
 
and the data shows they are disproportionately targeting the poor, alarm bells begin to ring. 
While I argue that a lack of trust in institutions may very well be contributing to Argentines 
being more committed to democracy, for democratic oversight puts a check on these institutions, 
the police are not being properly checked. Argentine elites need to prioritize police reform, and I 
argue they have blueprints and other models they can follow if they were to take this positive 
step. 
 The socioeconomic and generational findings across the region showcase that it is the 
young and the poor who are most at-risk in terms of abandoning democracy. Institutional reform 
absolutely plays a causal role, but so too do these mediating social cleavages. Those who lived 
under dictatorship are more supportive of democracy as they are more appreciative of what it has 
provided. Similarly, the wealthy are more supportive of democracy, because they are more 
economically prosperous under the current system. In accord, at-risk groups of society need to be 
sold on the benefits of democracy if these numbers are to improve. 
 Regarding the young, continuing to educate them on the horrors of dictatorship is vital. 
Initiatives that aim at defunding historical memory centers or whitewashing the crimes 
committed under dictatorship are socially irresponsible. Hegemonic narratives that which seek to 
downplay the abuses that were committed need to and will continue to be combated by activists 
and truth-tellers. In this regard, counterhegemonic forces should continue to fight the good fight, 
and will do, despite the obstacles that are thrown in their way. Regarding the poor, who are also 
often the young, crafting an economy that grants them economic mobility will best ensure their 
commitment to democracy. 
 Altogether, these cases and my findings present a complicated picture because social 
forces within countries are complicated. If it was straightforward and the causal chain direct, 
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there would be little need to study these trends in depth. There are positive takeaways and there 
are negative takeaways from these three cases and the region at large. Approaches can be taken 
that reduce the negative aspects, and alternatively others can be taken that exacerbate them. The 
next chapter in the Southern Cone will, in large part, be written by those who make the decisions 
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